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 This Article advances a new understanding of property rights by introducing the concept 
of the community aspect of private ownership. Unlike traditional accounts, which assign 
property rights to the individual owner alone, this Article argues that property rights should 
be conceived as held by the individual owner in partnership with her immediate community. 
The neighborhood within which a residential property is located holds a limited interest in 
that property. The Article reaches this conclusion following a discerning reading of the 
prevalent theories of property law. As they have so far mostly failed to acknowledge this 
community aspect of ownership, writers in these diverse traditions have not been able to 
provide a conceptualization of ownership that will correspond to their theories’ own prem-
ises. Through the prism of the community aspect of ownership, this Article thus provides not 
only a more accurate notion of ownership, but also a better view of the contending philoso-
phies of property. In addition, this Article suggests a legal reform that will promote the 
community aspect of ownership by stabilizing neighborhoods experiencing rapid change in 
the form of either abandonment or gentrification. Finally, this Article examines the ways in 
which its proposed community-invested idea of ownership can be applied to problems in 
other fields of property, torts, and intellectual property law.  
 I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................  760 
 II. THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY THEORY ....  766 
 A. Communitarian Theories .............................................................................  766 
 1.   The Communitarian Worldview......................................................  767 
 2.   Complicating to the Communitarian Worldview............................  772 
 3.   The Communitarian Worldview in Property Law ..........................  774 
 4.   Conclusion ........................................................................................  777 
 B. Utilitarian Theories......................................................................................  778 
 1.   Preferences for a Stable Community ...............................................  778 
 2.   Providing for a Stable Community: Markets and Dilemmas ........  781 
 a.   Stable Communities as a Public Good .....................................  781 
 b.   The Failure of Market Mechanisms in Policing the Provision 
of Community Stability ...................................................................  782 
 c.   The Strategic Dilemma Neighbors Face...................................  784 
 3.   Conclusion ........................................................................................  791 
 C. Right-Based Arguments ...............................................................................  791 
 1.   Personhood Theory...........................................................................  792 
 2.   Labor-Desert Theory ........................................................................  794 
 a.   The Theory.................................................................................  794 
 b.   The Production of Value............................................................  795 
 c.   The Production of Residential Properties’ Value .....................  798 
 d.   Conclusion..................................................................................  799 
 3.   Property as a Natural Right ............................................................  800 
 4.   Property as a Social Phenomenon ...................................................  803 
 5.   Conclusion ........................................................................................  805 
 D. Conclusion.....................................................................................................  806 
                                                 
 ∗ Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. S.J.D., LL.M. Harvard 
Law School; LL.B. Hebrew University. This Article originated in a paper written under the 
supervision of Joseph Singer at Harvard Law School, who was always extraordinarily gen-
erous with his time and advice. I further benefitted from extremely helpful comments on varied 
drafts of this Article from Ronen Avraham, Oren Bracha, William Forbath, Gerald Frug, 
Morton Horwitz, and Duncan Kennedy. Finally, thanks are due to participants in the Pro-
ject on Welfare, Justice, and Economics Workshop Series at Harvard University. 
760  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:759 
 
 III. THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY LAW 
PRACTICE: A PROPOSAL .......................................................................................  806 
 A. An Improving Neighborhood........................................................................  807 
 B. A Declining Neighborhood ...........................................................................  811 
 IV. THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND OTHER LEGAL 
PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................  813 
 A. Properties Other than Residential Units .....................................................  813 
 1.   Places of Worship .............................................................................  814 
 2.   Sports Teams....................................................................................  815 
 3.   Other Examples ................................................................................  816 
 C. Stigma-Based Nuisances..............................................................................  817 
 D. Intellectual Properties ..................................................................................  819 
 1.   Copyright ..........................................................................................  819 
 2.   The Right of Publicity ......................................................................  823 
 3.   Patents ..............................................................................................  823 
 V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  825 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
“For the quality of owning freezes you forever into ‘I,’ and cuts you off 
forever from the ‘we.’ ” John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath.1 
 On September 22, 1988, the City of Chicago issued a rezoning or-
dinance revising the land uses allowed on a parcel of land where an 
abandoned factory stood. The ordinance permitted commercial-
residential planned development.2 Maria Rodriguez, who lived nearby 
in a building she owned, should have been thrilled. Everyone pre-
dicted an increase in property values following the development—
a true windfall for Ms. Rodriguez.3 Nevertheless, Ms. Rodriguez 
did not view the ordinance as a blessing. Quite the opposite; she 
chose to go to court, arguing that the ordinance was a deprivation of 
her property in violation of the Illinois Constitution’s substantive due 
process guarantees.4  
 How so? If anything, her private property rights appeared to have 
been enhanced, as real estate values were to increase. Yet Ms. Rodri-
guez was looking beyond this traditional perception of enhancement 
and deprivation of private property rights. She understood her prop-
erty right as implying a broader entitlement; as being more than a 
mere economic private endowment. For Ms. Rodriguez, her private 
property right contained a community component without which it 
would lose much of its value. The rezoning ordinance was putting at 
risk that important element of her right. She feared the governmen-
tal act would entail a change in her community, offsetting any mone-
tary gain brought about by the increase in the property’s market 
value. She believed that the rise in property values following the re-
zoning would generate higher rents and property taxes leading to 
                                                 
 1. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 152 (centennial ed. 2002). 
 2.  Rodriguez v. Henderson, 578 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2). 
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residents’ displacement, thereby changing the local social fabric. 
Similarly, she worried that higher taxes might force her to move. 
Though she would sell her house at a profit, she would not be able to 
recreate elsewhere the atmosphere of her old neighborhood. By thus 
potentially transforming the community, the ordinance could de-
crease her subjective valuation of her land, even though it did not 
touch her parcel or injure the parcel’s objective valuation. 
 Such an argument strikes legal observers as novel, perhaps too 
novel. The Illinois trial court dismissed Ms. Rodriguez’s complaint, 
noting that it was “unaware of precedent which would recognize an 
increase in the property value as an injury” to an owner.5 But the 
state appellate court was undeterred by the unconventionality of the 
legal challenge, and it reversed the decision.6 It explained that “even 
if [Ms. Rodriguez’s] property might experience net dollar value in-
creases, theoretically realizable in the future,” 7  she would suffer 
harms, “including destruction of . . . neighborhood social and com-
mercial fabric.”8 Accordingly the court concluded that she had stated 
a constitutional claim.  
 In so doing, the Illinois Appellate Court implicitly recognized the 
community aspect of an owner’s property right. The Illinois Constitu-
tion mandates due process of law when a person is “deprived of . . . 
property.”9 Ms. Rodriguez was not deprived of her property under any 
traditional understanding of the terms “deprivation” or “property.”10 
The building was not confiscated, nor did it lose value.11 Regardless, 
as the court understood, her holdings were being altered in an irre-
versible way. This alteration was as troubling as any other damage 
                                                 
 5. Id. at 60. 
 6. Id. at 66. 
 7. Id. at 63. 
 8. Id. at 64. 
 9. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 10. Neither was her property “taken,” as this latter term is normally used and under-
stood in constitutional takings clauses. The Illinois Constitution employs the term in its 
eminent domain clause.  ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken . . . 
for public use without just compensation.”). The term and its common legal meaning are 
not irrelevant for due process analysis since American courts have not always clearly dis-
tinguished the takings test from the due process test when reviewing zoning ordinances. To 
find that a zoning ordinance violated substantive due process rights the Illinois courts 
require a showing that the enactment was “arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to the pub-
lic morals, safety and general welfare.” Mercer Lumber Cos. v. Vill. of Glencoe, 60 N.E.2d 
913, 916 (Ill. 1945). This test closely traces the federal standard, set by the Supreme Court 
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). That landmark decision 
blurred the lines between due process and takings. See Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due 
Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 906-07 (2007). 
The ambiguity persisted for decades, even though takings jurisprudence appeared to have 
emerged as an independent body of law a few years earlier.  The starting point for modern 
takings jurisprudence is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  
 11.  On the importance of loss of economic value in takings jurisprudence, see Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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the government could inflict on her land. While maybe not directly 
invading Ms. Rodriguez’s own private property, the government ac-
tion was impinging on her community. The Illinois ruling stands for 
the idea that the value of the individual piece of private property is 
intertwined with the value of the surrounding community. This Arti-
cle will argue that property law theory should embrace this view.  
 Owning property means more than owning land and walls. It denotes 
owning specific land and walls, which other lands and walls, owned by 
others, surround.12 Owning land is owning a part of a specific com-
munity. Removal of the community, just like removal of the land and 
walls, alters the nature of the property right. It does so in a different 
way that might be perceived as less intrusive, but it does so nonetheless.  
 Ownership contains a community aspect, and this aspect of own-
ership is not merely an attribute of an owner’s right that should be 
shielded from arbitrary government interference in the manner envi-
sioned by the Illinois court. The community aspect of ownership is 
much more meaningful than that. Ms. Rodriguez’s story illustrates 
this point nicely, for it did not end in the courts, where Ms. Rodriguez 
won the battle. Unfortunately, on her neighborhood’s streets, she 
probably lost the campaign. Her neighborhood, West Town,13 was to 
become the focal point for gentrification processes: households’ me-
dian income soared by more than 50%, and the median home value 
rose 176%.14 The neighborhood’s racial composition exhibited a clear 
trend of change: the non-Latino white population increased from 
27.4% to 39.39%, as the percentage of persons of Latino origin de-
creased from 59% to 46.85%.15 Latino homeowners were squeezed out 
as the assessed value of their properties for tax purposes increased 
dramatically.16 Thanks to all these developments West Town ended 
up extolled as the equivalent of New York City’s SoHo;17 unfortu-
nately, this eventuality was in all likelihood the exact outcome Ms. 
                                                 
 12.  Lee Anne Fennell coined the very useful and accurate term “the unbounded 
home.” The home has come unbound since threats to its value originate from events and 
conditions that lie outside the parcel’s boundaries and never cross those boundaries in a 
physical sense. Fennell mostly focuses on threats to the house’s objective monetary value. 
LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 
13, 25 (2009). 
 13. The decision does not specify the location of the property, but it does include the 
address of the rezoned factory, which is nearby. It is within the West Town neighborhood. 
 14. See David Mendell & Darnell Little, Rich ‘90s Failed to Lift All: Income Disparity 
Between Races Widened Greatly, Census Analysis Shows, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2002, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-08-20/news/0208200185_1_median-household-income-
whites-blacks.  
 15. U. ILL. AT CHI. NATHALIE P. VOORHEES CENTER FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND 
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT, GENTRIFICATION IN WEST TOWN: CONTESTED GROUND 20 (2001).  
 16.  A case study of one home owned by a Latino family shows consistent increases, 
including a jump in assessed value of 117% between 1995 and 1996 alone. Id. at 17. 
 17.  John J. Betancur, The Politics of Gentrification: The Case of West Town in Chicago, 
37 URB. AFF. REV. 780, 792 (2002). For more on gentrification in West Town, see id. 
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Rodriguez was dreading. It must have been an interference with the 
community aspect of her ownership: a stark decrease in her property 
right’s subjective value.18 Yet the state court, which had identified 
such harm as a deprivation of property, could not have come to her 
rescue this time around. Its decision introduced a remedy applicable 
where the cause of harm was a specific governmental decision;19 but 
here, the harm was generated mainly by the cumulative effect of pri-
vate decisions made by Ms. Rodriguez’s neighbors—a decision to sell 
their houses to gentrifiers and leave. The court was willing to act 
when there was state action: it addressed the problem within the 
contours of public law; but the underlying problem is broader than 
that—it extends to private law as well. 
 The fact that Ms. Rodriguez could find no legal redress for the 
diminution in her property right is a problem for property law. It also 
presents a challenge for the way we think about what property rights 
mean. This specific—though rather widespread—predicament en-
dured by Ms. Rodriguez and her neighbors should propel us to en-
gage a broader review of our theories of property. This Article will 
answer that call by highlighting the community aspect of ownership, 
thereby enriching our understanding of ownership as a concept and a 
legal institution. The time is ripe for such an intervention since the 
scholarly debate over the nature of property rights and their social 
role has recently gained much needed momentum.20  
 Yet, until it acknowledges the community aspect of ownership, 
this normative discussion will remain lacking. The action taken by 
the Illinois court was a bold move in recognizing the community 
aspect of ownership; still it was merely a first, and insufficient, step. 
In order for the community aspect of property to exist and benefit 
owners, it must also burden owners and limit their freedom. For Ms. 
Rodriguez to be able to safeguard the stable community that allowed 
her to enjoy her property, curtailing governmental powers was obvi-
ously not enough. Recognizing her neighbors’—and her own—
obligations created by the community interest in property is, as this 
Article will explain, necessary.  
                                                 
 18. For details on racial conflicts and outrage of the Latino community, see U. ILL. AT 
CHI., supra note 15.   
 19. For examples of earlier such proposals, see Frank I. Michelman, Property as a 
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981) and Richard Lewis, Destruction 
of Community, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 365 (1986). 
 20. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 
(2000); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003); 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 
(2005); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517 (2003); Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1193-94 (1999); Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
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 The right to a stable community carries a correlative duty on 
community members, i.e., the opposite of an unlimited freedom to 
move out.21 Lee Ann Fennell explains that while property within a 
neighborhood can be divided into individually owned units, important 
aspects of neighborhood life (e.g. “atmosphere” and greenbelts) are 
not amenable to being parceled out. 22  Thus, as she argues, the 
neighborhood has both privately owned elements and elements held 
in common by all neighbors and it should be viewed as a semicom-
mons.23 This very valid point can—and should—be carried further. 
Even the supposed privately owned elements of the community (i.e. 
individual parcels and structures) contain elements held in common. 
The concept of the community aspect of ownership, as promoted by 
this Article, holds that private property rights, normally perceived as 
belonging to the individual owner alone, are in fact held by the owner 
in partnership with the surrounding immediate community. In this 
partnership, the owner is by far the senior partner—her stake in the 
land is much greater than the neighborhood’s. Still, other members of 
the community hold an interest in the individual homes of their 
counterparts, as the latter affect their enjoyment of their own homes. 
A private owner has a right to expect the law to protect her property 
interests, and the community has a right to expect the same. The 
community interest in ownership, and the community itself, cannot 
be obliterated without hindrance. The neighborhood’s interest in the 
properties of residents entails the maintenance, at least to some de-
gree, of community stability, even at the cost of making it more bur-
densome for owners to exercise their freedom to sell their properties 
and leave.   
 This community interest in ownership should be introduced since 
it is a natural outgrowth of our thinking about property. As long as 
we do not recognize it, the property rules we adopt fail to serve their 
function. They treat a right that is inherently social as if it were a 
mere individual entitlement, independent, in its enjoyment, promise, 
and setbacks, from the surroundings. Commonly, it is assumed that 
this is only true if communitarian or relational conceptions of prop-
erty law’s role are adopted. These approaches highlight property 
rights’ contextual and social nature.24 When read in this fashion, it is 
easy to detect in property rights a community aspect. Yet property is 
not always interpreted in this way. For some theories of property, 
property is all about the individual and her independence from soci-
                                                 
 21. On rights and their correlatives, see Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-44 (1913). 
 22.  FENNELL, supra note 12, at 55, 64. 
 23.  On semicommon property rights, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property 
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
 24. See infra Sections II.A and II.C.4. 
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ety. According to such worldviews, property stands for privacy, for 
the ability to detach oneself from others’ desires and pursue idiosyn-
cratic preferences.25 Still it is the thesis of this Article that even in 
reliance on such individualistic theories of property the community’s 
stake in private ownership cannot be ignored. Even without assum-
ing that society predates private property, or that the community’s 
existence is an objective good, the community should be viewed as 
owning a stake in an individual’s private property. Recognizing this 
element of ownership entails a certain role for property rules: prop-
erty law should do more to stabilize communities so that the commu-
nity aspect of a given property is preserved.  
 In order to make this argument, Part II will analyze the compet-
ing theories that account for the existence of property rights and will 
demonstrate why law should recognize the community interest in-
herent to property rights. The first theory to be examined will be 
communitarianism, under which the case for the community aspect 
of property is the easiest to make. Afterwards, I will move to theories 
that at first blush appear less hospitable to my argument, examining 
utilitarian and right-based arguments. The objective of the exercise 
made in Part II is to illustrate how these diverse theories can all jus-
tify, and even necessitate, the recognition of the community interest 
in property. It follows that it is not the goal of Part II, or of this Arti-
cle as a whole, to pass judgment on the merits of these rival theories 
of property.  
 By the same token, the reader need not adopt all of the perspec-
tives presented in Part II in order to accept my conclusion. On the 
contrary, Part II aims at proving that be one’s preferred theoretical 
approach to property as it may, she should seriously consider the ex-
istence of the community aspect of private property. In this regard 
this Article assumes an approach that differs from that embraced by 
most property theorists whose work is reviewed in Part II. Adherents 
of competing schools of thought normally write with the aim of refut-
ing their counterparts’ theories. They thus focus on the polarities be-
tween theories. In this Article, I will rather try to bridge the gap be-
tween the different theories. I will demonstrate that, despite their 
many important contrasts, and mostly without even realizing it, 
these theories share common grounds with regards to the interplay of 
community and ownership. Without renouncing their own tenets or 
claims at exclusivity and superiority, the disparate theories should 
embrace an understanding of property that includes a community 
aspect. In order to make this argument in a coherent and persuasive 
manner Part II will introduce the contending theories with some detail. 
Those well versed in the relevant literature might naturally prefer to 
                                                 
 25. See infra Sections II.B and II.C.1-3. 
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read the more general segments of the discussion less closely and fo-
cus on the more particularized treatment of the community aspect. 
 To better understand the meaning of this proposed community 
aspect, I will supplement the theoretical discussion with a practical 
one. Part III will explain how the new understanding of the essence 
of property emerging from Part II should affect property law. As one 
possible application I will put forward a novel approach for tackling 
rapid neighborhood change—in the form of gentrification or aban-
donment—relying on varied legal tools including local taxation, rent 
control, and the provision of municipal services. Part III will thereby 
address the problem faced by Ms. Rodriguez and the many others 
whose plight as owners is currently ignored. Part IV will further bol-
ster the theoretical argument by reviewing its implications for other 
legal rules in the fields of property, nuisance, and intellectual property. 
 Finally, an important caveat should be kept in mind throughout 
this Article. The community right suggested here is not absolute. I 
am arguing that the community should be accorded partnership 
status in private properties. But in our liberal society, the community 
is solely the owner’s junior partner—and it must remain so. While 
property has a community aspect that should provide security and 
assure some degree of neighborhood stability, property is also a tool 
to promote liberty. The community interest in ownership does not 
imply an attempt to negate an owner’s ability to move out of her 
home and community. As its name indicates, the community aspect 
of ownership merely calls for the introduction of another aspect to 
private ownership, not for the institution’s abolition. 
II.    THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND   
PROPERTY THEORY 
A.   Communitarian Theories 
 In an influential study, sociologist Herbert Gans found that Levit-
town, New Jersey—the quintessential postwar American suburb—
was neither an economic unit whose members depended on each 
other, nor a cohesive social body.26 In this respect it differed greatly 
from earlier communities, such as the medieval town.27 Nevertheless, 
Gans discovered that in Levittown, very much like in the medieval 
town, there was the possibility of “an intense identification with the 
community” if exposed to an external threat.28 Communitarian theo-
                                                 
 26. HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND POLITICS IN A NEW 
SUBURBAN COMMUNITY 145 (1967). The town has since reverted to its original name: Wil-
lingboro Township.  
 27. On the medieval town, see GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING 
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 27-30 (1999). 
 28.  GANS, supra note 26, at 145. 
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ries seize upon this persistent sociological, non-materialistic role of 
communities in defining individuals.  
 Though pursued elsewhere for decades, these theories’ application 
to property discourse is a recent phenomenon.29 Nonetheless, as they 
make the most natural argument for recognizing community attributes 
of private ownership, they should serve as the starting point for this 
Article’s theoretical discussion. This Section will show how communi-
tarianism recognizes the community element inherent to ownership 
and advocates for an ensuing need to maintain stable neighborhoods.  
 1.   The Communitarian Worldview 
 Communitarian thought evolved in reaction to the liberal tradi-
tion, 30 and many of its proponents trace its roots to the Aristotelian 
idea of the “good life.”31 Communitarians reject the liberal notion that 
the “right” is prior to the “good.” They believe that “principles of jus-
tice depend for their justification on the moral worth . . . of the ends 
they serve,”32 i.e., on a particular conception of the good life.33 This 
position stands in stark contrast to the liberal aspiration at neutral-
ity, epitomized in the positioning of individual liberty as the substi-
tute for any predetermined set of values describing the good life. This 
liberal celebration of individual liberty is grounded in a conception of 
the individual that is rejected by communitarians. 
 The liberal individual is depicted by communitarians as an empty, 
atomized, disembodied, solitary, characterless self. The liberal self 
exists before her attributes, associations, and ends, which she only 
                                                 
 29. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 
10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES  L. 127 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 
VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005). In addition, Gerald Frug applied communitarian theories to local 
government law, FRUG, supra note 27, at 85-89, and Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of 
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989) 
to homeowners associations. The value of groups has also been used to justify the constitu-
tional protection of group rights. See Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The 
Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983). 
 30. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 
20 (1990). 
 31.  Aristotle believed that humans are not born with the capacity to live full human 
lives. Such lives require the cultivation of intellectual and moral virtues that can only take 
place when an individual forms a part of a political community. Humans can perform their 
highest actions, such as philosophy or virtuous acts, only within a community. Hence Aris-
totle described the relationship between the individual and the community as a part-whole 
relationship. Many, though not all, philosophers further argue that for Aristotle the com-
munity was a natural, or organic, entity. Compare David Keyt, Three Fundamental Theo-
rems in Aristotle’s Politics, 32 PHRONESIS 54 (1987), with Robert Mayhew, Part and Whole 
in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy, 1 J. ETHICS 325 (1997). 
 32.  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE xi (2d ed. 1998). 
 33. Id. at 185-86. 
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later chooses in an independent manner.34 The resulting liberal soci-
ety is constituted by many different selves, each with different ends. 
Values become nothing but the distinct expressions of preferences of 
the separate selves. In such a society there can be no aspiration to-
wards reaching an agreement regarding values or the nature of the 
good life, and hence each individual must be left free to set her own 
perceptions of the good life.35  
 Against this detached liberal self, communitarians posit their al-
ternative: a social self, deeply attached to her community. She is a 
situated self—born and placed into certain associations. The attach-
ments to these associations define her and mold her identity.36 With-
out them, the self is not only devoid of character,37 but also of the 
ability to feel, since feelings are learned through the experience of 
others and cannot be described even to oneself without sharing a tra-
dition of discourse.38 As Charles Taylor explains, “[m]y identity is de-
fined by the commitments and identifications which provide the 
frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to 
case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I 
endorse or oppose.”39 This is not to say that the self enjoys no inde-
pendence; the self can decide at a certain point in her life to break 
loose from her community and develop her unique identity and val-
ues. However, the uniqueness of her new values—indeed her inde-
pendence itself—will be defined in relation to the social values she 
previously absorbed.40  
 This portrayal of the self’s communal constitution is perceived as 
the heart of communitarian thinking. Michael Walzer, however, ar-
gues that fellow communitarians carry the point too far. He believes 
that the central issue is not the self’s constitution, but rather the pat-
tern of social relations.41 Liberalism is a theory of relationship that 
has voluntary associations at its center, with voluntarism meaning a 
persistent right of rupture.42 Communitarians view these ties not as 
                                                 
 34. Id. at 62-65, 94-95, 133, 186-88; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN 
MORAL THEORY 33 (2d ed. 1984); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF 
THE MODERN IDENTITY 35 (1989).  
 35. See SANDEL, supra note 32, at 175-77; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 507 (arguing 
further that since under such an outlook nothing outside subjective goals can be allowed to 
trump self-realization, the resulting modes of life are shallow). 
 36. See SANDEL, supra note 32, at 150; MACINTYRE, supra note 34, at 33-34; see also 
Duncan Kennedy, Political Power and Cultural Subordination: A Case for Affirmative Ac-
tion in Legal Academia, in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 83, 90 (Dan 
Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995). 
 37. SANDEL, supra note 32, at 179. 
 38. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 20-21 (1984). 
 39. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 27. 
 40. Id. at 36, 39. 
 41.  Walzer, supra note 30, at 21. 
 42. Id. at 20-21. 
2011] THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 769 
 
associations but as attachments, which the individual does not 
choose and which she is limited in her ability to sever.  
 The contrast between liberalism and communitarianism concern-
ing the nature of relationships is not merely theoretical. It has an 
empirical component. In this regard communitarianism is of a dualis-
tic quality. On the one hand it is a normative attack on a modern so-
ciety that has allegedly become liberal, lacking consensus and guided 
by private caprices. On the other hand, it is a sociological-empirical 
condemnation of modern liberal thinking for misrepresenting real life, 
in which social ties still matter. The normative and empirical argu-
ments cannot coexist: each implies an opposite diagnosis of modern 
society. Walzer settles the inconsistency by concluding that each of 
the two claims is only partly right.43 Modern society is indeed charac-
terized by a continuous motion of individuals, who leave behind, 
more easily than before, old associations and attachments. But indi-
viduals have remained to some degree creatures of community, 
whose ties of place, class, family, and politics survive new mobility.44  
 As the culmination of this—partly normative, partly sociological—
criticism of liberalism, communitarians prescribe a clear policy. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, who laments the loss of morality reaching its 
climax with modern liberalism, concludes with these powerful words:  
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of 
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life 
can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon 
us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors 
of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. 
This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the fron-
tiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time.45  
 MacIntyre and others view the reinstitution and reinforcement of 
communities as a moral concern. But it is not only a moral impera-
tive. It is also a political concern for the democratic state. Unlike 
Enlightenment European republicans who viewed intermediate 
communities as a threat to general society,46 communitarians regard 
these “partial societies” as vital for the survival of the state. The 
shattering of local communities will lead to the disintegration of the 
larger national community since a “society of self-fulfillers,” where 
                                                 
 43.  Id. at 20-22. 
 44. Id. at 7-14. 
 45. MACINTYRE, supra note 34, at 263. 
 46. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 17-18 (G. Cole trans., 2003). 
Some argue that Rousseau’s objection to intermediate associations was more attenuated. 
See Maure L. Goldschmidt, Rousseau on Intermediate Associations, in VOLUNTARY 
ASSOCIATIONS: NOMOS XI 119 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1969). Re-
gardless, American civic republicans have traditionally been much more sympathetic to 
intermediate communal entities. See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1493 (1988). 
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affiliations are perceived as revocable, cannot sustain the strong 
identification with the political community democracy requires.47 For 
this reason, in the words of John Dewey:  
When a state is a good state . . . . [i]t renders the desirable associa-
tions solider and more coherent . . . . it gives the individual mem-
bers of valued associations greater liberty and security: it relieves 
them of hampering conditions which if they had to cope with per-
sonally would absorb their energies in mere negative struggle 
against evils. It enables individual members to count with reason-
able certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates mutu-
ally helpful coöperations [sic].48 
 In so acting to preserve a community, the state unavoidably in-
flicts harms on some members of that community—it curtails their 
freedom in order to serve their community’s interests. As seen in the 
Introduction, the community interest is not only a right, but also a 
duty placed on community members. Under communitarian premises 
this harm is justified, even from the standpoint of the injured party. 
When required to enlist her resources in the service of a communal 
endeavor, the communitarian individual is not being used for others’ 
ends; she is contributing to the purposes of a community she regards, 
or regarded in the recent past, as her own. The justification for her 
sacrifice “is not the abstract assurance that unknown others will gain 
more than [she] will lose, but the rather more compelling notion that 
by [her loss she] contribute[s] to the realization of a way of life in 
which she take[s] pride and with which [her] identity is bound.”49  
 So far we have seen why community matters, why the state must 
act in order to help it survive, and why, when doing so, the state may 
demand contributions from community members. This is not enough 
for the purposes of this Article’s argument. For communitarianism to 
serve as grounds for recognizing a community aspect inherent to pri-
vate property and necessitating legal action to stabilize surroundings, 
it must be shown that the neighborhood—private land’s environ-
ment—is a community. For communitarians a community is not a 
spatial notion. A community is created by “a common vocabulary of 
discourse and a background of implicit practices and understandings 
within which the opacity of the participants is reduced if never fi-
nally dissolved.”50  
                                                 
 47. TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 508. 
 48. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 71-72 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927).  
 49. SANDEL, supra note 32, at 143. Not surprisingly, critics of communitarianism find 
such “ethics of sacrifice” worrisome. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Reimagining Takings Law, 
in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 39, 44 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver 
eds., 2010). 
 50. Id. at 172. 
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 Localities are frequently invoked in communitarian writings as 
examples of such communities,51 and it is widely believed that social 
groups are often constituted by their connection to land.52 As Jennifer 
Wolch and Michael Dear wrote, “social life structures territory . . . 
and territory shapes social life.”53 These claims are bolstered by the 
works of urban scientists who have found that neighborhoods provide 
residents with an important source of identity. Over the past half-
century the traditional notion of the neighborhood as an organic self-
contained unit has receded.54 Nonetheless, planners and social scien-
tists still consider the neighborhood to be a meaningful unit. While 
they accept that the neighborhood is a contested concept lacking a 
settled definition,55 most contend that this indeterminacy does not 
disprove the neighborhood’s existence.56 Even the currently prevalent 
open-ended definitions—such as that “a neighborhood is a limited 
territory within a larger urban area where people inhabit dwellings 
and interact socially”57—posit that neighborhoods offer not only spa-
tial demarcations but also social demarcations. Therefore it is not 
surprising that studies have found that residents will act passion-
ately relying on the meaning the neighborhood provides them.58  
 Communitarians will agree that the individual and her private 
abode are meaningless when separated from their surrounding com-
munity. Part of what makes an individual an individual, and a home 
a home, is their close environment. Identity is intimately tied to 
memory and a person’s memory is interconnected with the histories 
of her neighbors.59 Therefore,  
a more humane conception of land has to go beyond the notion of a 
physical, material space demarcated by a finite number of square 
feet. It also must be understood as an integral part of the social 
                                                 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 143. 
 52. Alexander, supra note 29, at 11-12. 
 53.  THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHY: HOW TERRITORY SHAPES SOCIAL LIFE 4 (Jennifer 
Wolch & Michael J. Dear eds., 1989). 
 54.  See, e.g., GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITIES (1972); 
HERBERT J. GANS, PEOPLE, PLANS, AND POLICIES: ESSAYS ON POVERTY, RACISM, AND OTHER 
NATIONAL URBAN PROBLEMS (1991). 
 55.  ROBERT K. YIN, CONSERVING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS 121 (1982); NAT’L 
COMM’N ON NEIGHBORHOODS, PEOPLE, BUILDING NEIGHBORHOODS: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1979). 
 56.  HOWARD W. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOODS: THEIR PLACE IN URBAN LIFE 15 (1984). 
 57.  Id. at 13. For a similar definition, see ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 15 (1981). 
 58. JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLACE 101-02, 107-08 (1987). 
 59.  DOLORES HAYDEN, THE POWER OF PLACE: URBAN LANDSCAPES AS PUBLIC HISTORY 
9 (1997). 
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and spiritual life of our communities—socially produced places 
that have meaning for all of us.60  
Communitarians will argue that measures should be adopted so that 
the neighborhood, given its importance as a community, can persist. In 
a similar vein, a communitarian will object to the perception of the 
neighborhood as a mere commodity, whose fate is to be determined by 
market dynamics generated by the actions of supposedly despotic 
owners. The mere use of price rhetoric in this context can be accused of 
engendering social alienation, of undermining personal identity, and of 
doing “violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.”61 
 2.   Complicating to the Communitarian Worldview 
 While the communitarian endorsement of neighborhoods as com-
munities that property law should embrace is straightforward, it of-
ten seems too simplistic. It should be fine-tuned. I will now examine 
several critiques of communitarianism and use their counter-
arguments to question and revise several of the broad statements 
made above.  
 A forceful denial of many communitarian assumptions is found in 
post-modernist theory. Post modernists, occupied with the decon-
struction of identity, view the self as fragmented and shifting.62 This 
post-modern self is embedded within a matrix of social and psycho-
logical factors.63 The effort at prescribing one identity to the self is 
not merely fruitless—it is dangerous; all the interlacing identities 
within the self are delusional and serve as tools for exercising power 
over her, by defining the “self” and contrasting her with the “other.” 
The self’s identity and relationships, complex and highly mobile, are 
performances. They are not an “internal” feature of hers, but an ef-
fort she makes to live up to an invented figure others created for her. 
The choice of words here is important: the self is invented, but is by 
no means false, as there is no “true inner self” to be repressed.64  
 These few lines cannot begin to convey the richness and complex-
ity of post-modernist literature, but they introduce the essence of the 
post-modernist reply to this Section’s themes. They suggest that the 
neighborhood should not be treated as the self’s main source of iden-
                                                 
 60.  TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS GLOBAL 
REAL ESTATE 22 (2008). 
 61. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1905-06 
(1987); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 164-66 (1993). 
 62.  Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path 
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 307-08 (1991). 
 63.  Id. at 307. 
 64. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY xiv-xv, 181-90 (1999); FRUG, supra note 27, at 92-97; JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, 
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 14-17 (1984); ROBIN WEST, 
CARING FOR JUSTICE 281-84 (1997); Williams, supra note 62, at 306-08. 
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tity; that we should be sensitive to the discourse of power associated 
with spatial identities and with any community component inserted 
into private rights. The basic demand post-modernism makes is to 
realize that the community and the connections that allegedly tie in-
dividual residents to it are performances. But what are the implica-
tions of these observations?  
 Mostly they advise us to exercise caution in arguing for the social 
component of the self generally and for neighborhood stability par-
ticularly. Caution here does not necessarily entail a substantial revi-
sion of the communitarian project. Caution implies acknowledging 
that each individual has many identities, and that the neighbor-
hood—or any other community—may be the mainstream’s weapon 
for subjugating minorities. Despite this cautionary note, the post-
modernist perspective does not deny the need for personal and com-
munity identity. Post-modernism does not require law to ignore the 
enabling and constitutive power that identities and communities ex-
ert over people’s lives and feelings. They might be performances, 
mythical rather than real connections, but they still influence people 
and hence deserve recognition. 
 The neighborhood is an “imagined community,” 65  often defined 
less by actual interactions and “true” identity than by subjective per-
ceptions and beliefs regarding the existence and importance of said 
interactions and identity.66 This does not mean that the neighborhood 
is a mere personal fantasy that can persist indefinitely regardless of 
changes to surrounding places and people.67 Rather it is an inter-
subjective creation. Being a “neighbor” might be a performance, but 
one that needs to be performed with, and in front of, others who are 
engaged in the same performance and understand it. The fleeting 
and seemingly meaningless sight of a neighbor, the knowledge that 
she is there, constructs the neighborhood and confers psychic benefits. 
The neighborhood might be imagined, but it is still important for in-
dividuals and thus should carry legal weight. 
                                                 
 65. The term “imagined community” was coined by Benedict Anderson to describe the 
notion of the nation. Anderson explained that the nation is imagined since its members 
view themselves as related to one another, despite the fact that they have never met all 
their “fellow” nationals. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 5-6 (rev. ed. 1991).  
 66.  Residents sometimes even have difficulty describing the boundaries of their 
neighborhoods. See generally ALBERT HUNTER, SYMBOLIC COMMUNITIES (1974). They will 
talk about “their neighborhood” or “their community,” even though the boundaries and 
meanings of these self-defined places are unlikely to be exact. WILLIAM PETERMAN, 
NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING AND COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT: THE POTENTIAL AND 
LIMITS OF GRASSROOTS ACTION 21 (2000). 
 67.  See ANGOTTI, supra note 60, at 22 (“[S]tories of people threatened with displacement 
show how land may evoke deep feelings and emotions associated with the everyday lives 
and activities of people. This approach cannot be understood as purely ‘subjective’ because 
ideologies and symbols have a material base and are a material force in the world.”). 
774  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:759 
 
 This revised understanding of the nature of community can be 
used as a reply to a critique of the communitarian case coming from 
another quarter. Some argue that it is a mistake to group all 
neighborhoods under the same heading. They concede that some 
neighborhoods are communities and should be protected, but they 
contend that other neighborhoods are not communities. These views 
are associated with an understanding of community as implying real 
life interactions. When faced with a neighborhood where one resident 
has never talked to another, adherents to this understanding deny 
the neighborhood’s pretensions of community status.68 This “behav-
ioralist” approach would therefore require, before a specific locale is 
granted protection, an empirical examination to determine to what 
degree its residents interact.69  
 But the portrayal of the neighborhood as an imagined community 
renders unsustainable such cries for empirical distinctions. The ex-
perience of community is richer than that represented by any metric 
of interactions suggested by a behavioralist approach. As we saw, the 
neighborhood defies easy objective definitions.70 The community is 
based on imagination and beliefs, and thus there is no need for it to 
always have actual, objective, or easily identifiable features. “A 
neighborhood is a subjective entity as well as an objective reality. Its 
face and form and the social relations within are what individual 
residents perceive.”71 The neighborhood as residents imagine it, an 
abstract invented idea, may be more important than the neighbor-
hood residents actually experience. Even when its beneficial attrib-
utes are a shared fantasy, the neighborhood still delivers those bene-
ficial attributes. Without them, the individual loses something that is 
important to her constitution, and her private property ceases to per-
form a function that is extremely important.  
 3.   The Communitarian Worldview in Property Law 
 Communitarian theories are invoked much less often than theo-
ries presented in the following Sections when property law rules are 
debated. Still, their neglect does not render them irrelevant; they are 
not alien to existing property rules. 
 The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of maintaining 
communities, noting that “the State has a legitimate interest in local 
                                                 
 68. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 87-89 (1993).  
 69. An example for this research approach is social networks analysis. See, e.g., Gary 
Bridge, Gentrification, Class and Community: A Social Network Approach, in THE URBAN 
CONTEXT: ETHNICITY, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 259 (Alisdair Rogers 
& Steven Vertovec eds., 1995). 
 70.  See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
 71.  HALLMAN, supra note 56, at 13. See also NAT’L COMM’N ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra 
note 55, at 7 (admiting an inability to provide an agreed definition of “neighborhood,” and 
concluding that “[i]n the last analysis, each neighborhood is what the inhabitants think it is”).  
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neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability.”72 It thus up-
held a property tax scheme that discriminated against similarly lo-
cated properties in the service of neighborhood preservation.73 Else-
where, citing the same public interest in preserving neighborhood 
character, the Court authorized the curtailment of owners’ free 
speech in an effort to disperse adult motion picture theatres through-
out the city.74 Other courts have addressed governmentally inflicted 
harms to neighborhoods’ stability in similar communitarian terms. 
When New York City approved the construction of a luxury building 
in Chinatown, the state Court of Appeals ruled that under the State 
Environmental Quality Review Act,75 the city should have considered 
detrimental effects on the Chinatown community. The court con-
strued the phrase “environmental impact” as including impact upon 
“neighborhood character.”76  
 Furthermore, communitarian thinking exerts tremendous influ-
ence throughout whole bodies of property law. Zoning laws, often 
presented as tools for spatial engineering, function to a great extent 
as measures of social engineering. They are employed to control the 
community, not just the environment.77 Restricting construction to 
single-family units, mandating minimum lot sizes, limiting the abil-
ity to subdivide, capping the number of unrelated occupants—these 
laws serve to keep unwanted persons out of the community.78 Exclu-
sionary zoning is many times attributed to municipalities’ desire in 
ensuring a tax base,79 but some argue that it is mainly driven by non-
fiscal reasons, such as preferences for racial and income homogeneity 
and preservation of suburban lifestyles.80 These non-fiscal reasons 
can be understood, at least to some extent, as communitarian.  
 Zoning laws are no longer the only instrument designing the envi-
ronments and communities within which owners exercise their rights. 
                                                 
 72. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992). 
 73.  Id. 
 74. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 75. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (Consol. 2011). 
 76. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass'n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180 (N.Y. 1986). 
The federal statute, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4321, has not been 
interpreted in this manner. See Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 77. See, e.g., J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 
761, 762-67, 777-78, 806-07 (1982). 
 78. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 186. 
 79. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 730-31 
(N.J. 1975). The seminal paper on fiscal zoning is Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property 
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975) (explaining that by 
setting a minimum value for properties in the locality, zoning assures that buyers will pay 
a minimum share of property taxes). There are other economic motives for exclusionary 
land use control, as explained in Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Con-
trols in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163, 173-77 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).  
 80. DUANE WINDSOR, FISCAL ZONING IN SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES 38-39, 41-42 (1979). 
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As many as sixty million Americans are now living in housing subject 
to covenants limiting the uses of their properties and governed by a 
condominium or homeowners association. 81  Traditionally, property 
law placed many restrictions on the ability to create and enforce 
covenants, as they curtail the owner’s freedom to use her land. The 
legal drive to liberalize these old laws of restrictive covenants culmi-
nated in the adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes) 
in the year 2000. It has facilitated the placement of intrusive restric-
tions on the rights of owners.82 These can, for example, forbid re-
painting,83 constructing or dismantling a fence,84 hanging curtains,85 
planting trees,86 or keeping pets.87 They might also limit an owner’s 
freedom to lease or sell her property. 88  Such restrictions do not 
merely safeguard certain desired neighborhood aesthetics; they also 
ensure that the residents themselves correspond to a certain “com-
munity character.”89 Affirmative covenants, such as a duty to pay fees 
for membership in a recreational club,90 serve a similar function.  
 Covenants are regarded by many as forms of private governance, 
assuming roles once ascribed to public government.91 Yet individual-
istic-utilitarian explanations cannot alone account for homeowners 
associations’ popularity. Covenants have generally not been carefully 
designed to assure maximization of property values. For example, 
                                                 
 81. According to estimates, as of 2010, 62 million Americans were living in homeown-
ers associations, condominiums, or cooperatives. An estimated 309,600 such planned com-
munities existed, containing 24.8 housing units overall. Cmty. Ass’ns Inst., Industry Data: 
National Statistics, http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2011).  
 82. For more on restrictive covenants and homeowners associations, see, for example, 
EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT  (1994) and James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory 
Servitudes: Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 
1989 WIS. L. REV. 1, 88 (1989). 
 83. See, e.g., W. Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). 
 84. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kite Hill Cmty. Ass’n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 85. See Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restric-
tiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553, 556 (2002). 
 86. See, e.g., Ironwood Owners Ass’n IX v. Solomon, 224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 87. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63 (Cal. 1994). 
But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5 (West 2007) (adopted following the decision, and making it 
illegal for an association to prohibit owners from keeping at least one pet). 
 88. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass’n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 141 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that a restriction on the right of alienation requiring that the condo-
minium board consent to a sale will be upheld if exercised reasonably); Franklin v. Spada-
fora, 447 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (Mass. 1983) (upholding covenant limiting the number of units 
a person can own in a condominium, thereby barring one resident from selling to another); 
Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that condominium declaration prohibited leases). 
 89. Racially restrictive covenants, though, are now forbidden. See Fair Housing Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 120 (1948).  
 90. See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783, 793 (Neb. 1993). 
 91. See Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976). 
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they do not allow for deviation from association rules whenever an 
expert panel predicts that an owner’s proposed action will increase 
property values.92 The reason is that covenants are not only meant to 
keep property values from declining; they are meant to preserve 
community character, even when threatened by actions that increase 
property values.  
 In light of this role of homeowners associations, the legal regime that 
allowed them to prosper can be viewed as corresponding to communi-
tarian views.93 The willingness of property law in this and the other 
contexts presented in this Subsection to further communitarian 
causes illustrates how communitarian ideas can be employed to legiti-
mize the recognition of the community interest in property. It shows 
that doing so will not be out of line with existing property principles.  
 If anything, it will complement them. Law has on many occasions 
restricted its recognition of the community interest to affluent com-
munities. While exclusionary zoning and homeowners association 
laws serve communitarian goals in private properties situated in 
relatively affluent neighborhoods, political authorities and courts 
have been much less eager to adopt similar community-promoting 
property rules when inner city properties are concerned.94 This dis-
crimination against the community needs of lower income residents 
is troubling, since the local community and the social ties it engen-
ders play a larger role in the lives of the poor than in the lives of the 
affluent.95 The latter, given their resources and salience, may much 
more easily find and, if necessary, create other communities within 
which they feel at home and freely express their identities.96  
 4.   Conclusion 
 Communitarian theories insist that the individual cannot exist 
without the community, and thus she cannot be served by private 
rights, such as ownership, that lack a community component. They 
advocate for the protection of neighborhood stability, and property 
law indeed recognizes this need in many fields. Yet as persuasive as 
the communitarian case may be, the protection of neighborhood sta-
bility must not be absolute. An extreme communitarian conception 
will lead to effacement of the individual and erosion of freedom.97 
                                                 
 92. Homeowners associations’ staunch supporters have recognized the need for allow-
ing covenants’ modification without a unanimous vote, as is customary. See Richard A. 
Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 922 (1988).  
 93. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 11-12, 40-42.  
 94. See FRUG, supra note 27, at 81-82.  
 95. Jeffery James Minton, Rent Control: Can and Should It Be Used to Combat Gen-
trification? 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 823, 827, 833 (1997). 
 96. For a similar argument, see RADIN, supra note 68, at 70, 97. 
 97. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW 
AGE 147-50, 231-32 (1984); Dagan, supra note 49, at 44.  
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Furthermore, community members are not the only ones to pay the 
price of the community’s empowerment. Outsiders, the “others” used 
to define the community members’ “we,” pay a higher toll.98 As put by 
Gregory Alexander, “[c]ommunities by their very nature exclude.”99  
 Rigid adherence to the ideal of stable neighborhoods is extremely 
dangerous. It will block residents from moving out, impeding their 
pursuit of lives they desire. It will prevent others, immigrants who 
could have improved their own living standards and enriched the 
neighborhood, from moving in.100 We must not blind ourselves to the 
costs of zealously promoting community stability. This is a key theme 
of this Article—stability and change must be allowed to interplay. We 
need and want stability to exist side by side with change, not at its 
expense. Most communitarians will agree with this contention;101 it is 
not clear, however, whether communitarianism can offer a sensible 
balance. Communitarians should not ignore the role of the individual 
and mobility, just as liberals should not ignore the role of the com-
munity and stability. 
B.   Utilitarian Theories 
 In the preceding Section the justification for recognizing the com-
munity’s stake in a private owner’s right and the ensuing legal need 
to promote neighborhood stability was derived from the community’s 
alleged intrinsic value. That is, the community was perceived as a 
good in itself. Utilitarian theories vehemently reject any such notion. 
The only goods they recognize are those originating in the individual 
and her preferences. The community as such is of no value.102 But 
what if individuals, independently, want a community? This Section 
will put forward possible utilitarian responses to this challenge, de-
veloping a utilitarian case for the community aspect of ownership.  
 1.   Preferences for a Stable Community 
 Welfare economics, probably the currently most prevalent utilitar-
ian theory, assesses policies exclusively in terms of their effects on 
individuals’ wellbeing. 103  The notion of wellbeing—“utility”—
incorporates everything that an individual might value.104 The analy-
                                                 
 98. See William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1403-
1412 (1991).  
 99. Alexander, supra note 29, at 52.  
 100. See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
947, 953 (1991). 
 101. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 30, at 21-22. 
 102. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 12 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Oxford University Press 1996) (1781). 
 103. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002).  
 104. Id. at 18. 
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sis revolves around the actual preferences of individuals, not on what 
the analyst thinks these preferences ought to be.105  
 Hence, for welfare economics to support legal promotion of com-
munity stability, it must be shown that stability corresponds to indi-
viduals’ actual preferences. Some evidence for the existence of such a 
preference was provided earlier when the popularity of homeowners 
associations was noted. Americans are eager to be able to exercise 
control not only upon the physical contours of their homes, but also 
upon the surroundings’ human composition. Their motivation might 
be assuring quality of living, and it might also be that such control 
preserves property values: in either case the premiums owners put on 
exerting this power indicate a potent preference for avoiding change.  
 A strong consumer preference for living in homogenous neighbor-
hoods exists.106 Housing in such neighborhoods commands a substan-
tial “exclusivity premium.”107 Anxiety and social fright are widely as-
sociated with anticipated neighborhood change. 108  The American 
suburban dream has been based on the constant fear of being caught 
up by people of lower standing, of neighborhoods being “invaded.” 
More recently, as the Introduction demonstrated, inner city home-
owners have turned apprehensive as higher-class residents invade 
their neighborhoods. All these observations indicate an intense pref-
erence for neighborhood stability. 
 This preference is readily explicable. The neighborhood is the focal 
point of residents’ daily routine. Since routines only develop after a 
lengthy process of trial and error, neighborhood change undermining 
a routine’s element is costly. Neighborhoods also supply residents 
with informal support networks, which deliver various goods, ranging 
from a cup of sugar and babysitting to political connections. These 
bonds enable people to rely on one another.109 The bonds of trust also 
allow residents to learn what to expect from each other. Residents 
can then cooperate in order to achieve common goals, such as better 
local services.110 Neighborhood bonds facilitate the creation of social 
norms and other coping mechanisms that invisibly control behavior 
and prevent unacceptable actions, like parking across another’s 
driveway or playing loud music at night. These civil forces control 
uncivil actions, and only in exceptional cases is police intervention 
                                                 
 105. See id. at 409-463. 
 106. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1167, 1199-1201 (1981). 
 107. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary 
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 55-59 (1996).  
 108. CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN 
AMERICA 109 (1977). 
 109. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 103-05. 
 110. Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of 
Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 71 (2001). 
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needed. These norms and their informal enforcement render residents’ 
lives more agreeable. When neighborhood stability is lost, social 
norms break down.111 In addition, a stable neighborhood provides a 
sense of physical and psychic security that comes with a familiar and 
dependable environment. Being a part of a stable community provides 
the benefit of membership in an orderly and protective social space. 
Finally, a neighborhood enables residents to benefit from economies 
of scale; residents enjoy benefits that would have been unavailable 
had they not been living within the community. The concentration of 
a large number of similar people stimulates the development of ag-
glomerations appropriate to their needs. For example, in an immi-
grants’ community residents will enjoy restaurants, shops, and enter-
tainment venues tailored to their customs. If the community disinte-
grates and its members disperse, such businesses will not be oper-
ated and the individuals will be deprived of goods they desire.112  
 The conclusion is that individuals entertain a preference for stable 
communities, as these enhance their welfare. Obviously, this prefer-
ence is different from a preference for, say, running water or heating. 
Unlike running water or heating, a stable community is an intangi-
ble good. The quantification of such a good is always difficult. It is 
rendered even more difficult in this case since a stable community 
entertains characteristics of an irreplaceable good. Owners prize 
their community because it is unique, and hence its valuation in-
creases dramatically when the individual owns a right in it. There-
fore, the discrepancy between relevant asking and offering prices is 
likely to be substantial,113 and the allocation of a property right in the 
community’s preservation will greatly influence its valuation.  
 These characteristics make it challenging for economic analysis to 
calculate the preference, since the analysis tends to focus on prefer-
ences’ monetary values. Indeed, efficiency analysis has been criti-
cized for not accounting for the loss of a community’s way of life as a 
cost.114 Yet the difficulty associated with appraising such intangible 
preferences, accompanied by lack of rigor on the part of some ana-
lysts, is no valid justification for welfare economics to ignore a viable 
preference.115 Welfare economics, as explained above, is interested in 
all actual preferences regardless of their nature.  
                                                 
 111. ROLF GOETZE, UNDERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: THE ROLE OF 
EXPECTATIONS IN URBAN REVITALIZATION 92 (1979).  
 112. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 105-09. 
 113. On these problems of valuating irreplaceable goods, see Daniel S. Levy & David 
Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic 
Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994).  
 114. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 124-125; Radin, supra note 61, at 1878. 
 115. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 124-125; Radin, supra note 61, at 1878; KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 103, at 454-55. 
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 2.   Providing for a Stable Community: Markets and Dilemmas 
 After a preference for a good has been identified, welfare economic 
analysis inquires whether legal intervention in the allocation of 
rights is necessary to assure the supply of desired quantities of the 
good. I intend to prove that such a need exists since problems of col-
lective action inhibit the market from providing desired levels of 
community stability. 
 a.   Stable Communities as a Public Good 
 A stable community is in many ways a public good, yet it is not a 
classic or pure public good. Public goods are defined by two attributes: 
non-rivalry of consumption and non-excludability of benefits.116 Ap-
plication of these criteria to neighborhood stability produces ambigu-
ous results. As to non-rivalry of consumption, a resident’s partaking 
in the consumption of neighborhood stability’s benefits does not re-
duce the benefits derived by others. On the other hand, each outsider 
added to the pool of consumers of neighborhood stability—each new 
resident—is likely to subtract from the enjoyment of stability by 
other neighbors: newcomers, by their very nature, contradict stability. 
In this regard neighborhood stability corresponds to the definition of 
a “club good,” which involves only a certain degree of “publicness” in 
consumption. It is a good optimally consumed by more than one per-
son but less than an infinitely large number of persons. Beyond a cer-
tain group size, the benefit that the individual places on the good will 
decline as congestion sets in.117  
 The non-excludability criterion also indicates that we are faced 
with a case of a partially public good: insiders cannot be excluded 
from enjoying the benefits derived from a stable community, while 
outsiders can be excluded. The latter can be blocked via zoning or 
covenants from moving into the neighborhood and enjoying the com-
munity’s stability. Still, not all benefits generated by a stable com-
munity can be withheld from outsiders. A community’s stability may 
confer benefits on the entire society. Displacement, gentrification, 
and neighborhood abandonment have negative social and economic 
effects—externalities—burdening the entire society. These include 
extreme poverty, social unrest, homelessness, crime, and arson.118 To 
                                                 
 116. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8-9 (2d ed. 1996); see also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. 
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 44 (Scott D. Stratford ed., 5th ed. 
1989) (noting that “[a]lthough the features of nonrival consumption and nonexcludability 
need not go together, they frequently do”).  
 117.  James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965). 
 118. See James Brady, The Social Economy of Arson: Vandals, Gangsters, Bankers and 
Officials in the Making of an Urban Problem, in 6 RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 199, 212 (Steven Spitzer & Andrew T. Scull eds., 1984).  
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the extent that neighborhood stability prevents such phenomena, its 
benefits are non-excludable.  
 b.   The Failure of Market Mechanisms in Policing the Provision of 
Community Stability 
 That neighborhood stability is not endowed with all the character-
istics of a public good does not necessarily render it a regular con-
sumer good. No good fits fully the polar definition of a public good.119 
Moreover, the major market mechanism regulating the provision of 
private goods is highly problematic when used for the efficient provi-
sion of neighborhood stability. The “exit” mechanism represents the 
ability to stop consuming a certain producer’s products. It is vital to 
the functioning of an efficient market, as it communicates consumers’ 
desires to producers and forces them to adjust. Goods provided by 
local government have triggered debate regarding their dual nature 
as public and consumer goods, mainly due to the controversial role of 
this “exit” mechanism in local life.  
 In a highly influential article, Charles Tiebout sought to show that 
local services are very much like ordinary private goods.120 In his 
model, the nation is perceived as a market, where each municipality 
supplies public goods—such as education, sanitation, and security—
at a price—represented by taxation—and consumers choose freely the 
municipality that satisfies best their set of preferences. Citizens pick 
a locality in the same manner as they choose any other product: Tiebout 
compares the citizen’s search for a community to a “shopping trip.”121 
The model’s basic premise is that if the city does not provide the ser-
vices desired by an individual she can move to another provider—she 
can exercise the “exit” mechanism. This ability to leave a municipality 
spurs competition over consumers, assuring municipalities’ efficiency.122   
 The model’s assumptions—e.g., that people are fully mobile and 
have perfect knowledge regarding the quality of municipal services—
have been denounced as unrealistic.123 More important for this Arti-
cle’s purposes, the mere exercise of the action of leaving a commu-
nity—i.e., the operation of the “exit” mechanism—dramatically de-
creases social welfare. Normally, when a consumer chooses to avoid 
                                                 
 119. 5 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 48-50 (1999). 
 120. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). 
 121. Id. at 422. 
 122. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970).  
 123. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1998); Clayton 
P. Gillette, The Wrong Side of the Tracks: A Revolutionary Rediscovery of the Common Law 
Tradition of Fairness in the Struggle Against Inequality, 100 HARV. L. REV. 946, 959-60 
(1987) (book review). Tiebout himself admitted that these two assumptions are problematic. 
See Tiebout, supra note 120, at 423.  
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consuming a product, her choice does not directly and immediately 
affect her peers’ ability to remain loyal to that product and reap 
the benefits they detect in it. This, however, is not the case with 
the choice of a municipality. “Everybody who selects a new environ-
ment affects the environments of those he leaves and those he moves 
among.”124 A consumer’s decision to leave a municipality hampers 
the ability of those left behind to enjoy local services, especially as 
the first to exit a deteriorating community are the most quality-
conscious members, those who could make the greatest contribution 
to fighting deterioration.125  
 In the context of neighborhood stability the problem intensifies: a 
member’s choice to resort to the “exit” mechanism not only hastens 
the deterioration of the good’s supply to others, but it actually embod-
ies the deterioration. Since stability—people not departing en 
masse—is the product, its supply cannot systematically be improved 
by residents’ departure.126 True, the “exit” mechanism is not wholly 
counterproductive. Stability implies that the residents maintain a 
certain character, not necessarily that they remain the same indi-
viduals. Some individual turnover may even be vital to the mainte-
nance of the characteristic that makes some neighborhoods desirable. 
For example, a neighborhood cherished by owners as a good envi-
ronment for families can only persist if at least some of its residents 
leave once they become empty nesters.127 At that time those owners 
should choose a neighborhood which better fits their new preferences. 
Similarly, an immigrants’ neighborhood cannot be maintained unless 
the established and integrated younger generations depart and are 
replaced by more recent immigrants. But even in such neighborhoods, 
when those exercising the “exit” mechanism are the residents who 
contribute to the neighborhood’s character (i.e. in the first case fami-
lies with children and in the second case recently arrived immi-
grants), stability—the relevant good—is threatened. 
 Moreover, the “exit” mechanism not only impedes the ability of 
those who remain to enjoy the good, it also fails to provide the con-
sumer opting for exit greater benefits from the good. Exiting a com-
munity and entering a different one stands in opposition to the exit-
ing individual’s own desire to enjoy a stable community, for mobility 
contrasts stability. The definition of the relevant good—neighborhood 
                                                 
 124.  THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 150 (1978). 
 125. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 45-47, 49-51. 
 126. See Fennell, supra note 110, at 28-30 (arguing that “exit” cannot serve as a viable 
feedback mechanism for spurring improvement in local education and security services 
because the consumers are the product: consumers of municipalities don’t choose a product, 
but rather who to live with. Thus, when they choose to leave one pool of users, the remain-
ing consumers cannot improve who they are).  
 127.  This assumes, of course, that not all neighbors become empty nesters at the same 
moment and accordingly adopt a new preference regarding the character of the neighborhood. 
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stability—is limited membership turnover; that is to say, limited ex-
its and entries. Hence offering “exit” as a mechanism to supply the 
good is very often contradictory to the good’s nature. 
 The “exit” mechanism cannot be fully relied on to discipline the 
community to better appease members’ tastes, which is its healthy 
market effect elsewhere. “Exit,” however, is not the only market 
mechanism regulating the provision of goods. The other mechanism 
associated with consumer goods and often appealed to when local 
government services are discussed is the mechanism of “voice.”128 As 
first explained by Albert Hirschman, the customer’s option of “exit” is 
sometimes complemented or even substituted by expressing dissatis-
faction to the managing authority.129 Thanks to the ability of con-
sumers to voice their concerns, producers become advised of market 
preferences and the market can operate more efficiently. Unfortu-
nately, the ability to assure desired levels of neighborhood stability 
as a consumer good via the mechanism of “voice” is limited. The no-
tion of “voice” assumes a distinction between consumers and man-
agement. It presupposes a tiered system with one level of consumers 
and another of decisionmakers charged with controlling the quality of 
the good provided to costumers.130 With neighborhood stability as a 
good, the role of such central decisionmakers is secondary. Each 
member needs to influence not only government to act, but other 
members to act—i.e., to stay (recall the Introduction). Obviously, 
governmental policies may indirectly influence other members’ deci-
sions, yet eventually each member makes her own decision. Hence 
utilizing one’s “voice” to influence “management” can only help in 
providing the good up to a certain point.  
 c.   The Strategic Dilemma Neighbors Face 
 Market tools are inadequate for the supply of community stability. 
The main reason is that many times the situation involves a strategic 
dilemma. All neighbors may want a stable community, but in order to 
attain and maintain it they must act in concert. At the same time, 
each neighbor may have an incentive to bail out whenever market 
conditions make selling her house appealing.131 The situation is likely 
to be aggravated by a fear of change strengthening the tendency to 
                                                 
 128. See LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 338 (3d ed. 2004) (and sources listed therein).  
 129. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 4; see also id. at 15-20, 30-43. 
 130. Fennell, supra note 110, at 23-24.  
 131.  See Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tip-
ping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157, 174 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972) 
(discussing the case of the deteriorating community, in which the owner seeks to limit her 
monetary exposure). Since an owner risks a capital loss, she attempts to get rid of her 
house a little sooner than everyone else. This is a strong incentive leading to spirals of 
neighborhood decline.  See id.  
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sell, thereby prompting change in a “feedback loop.”132 Housing mar-
kets are easily susceptible to such self-fulfilling prophecies, as own-
ers are sensitive to perceived “changes in the wind” that may alter 
neighborhood characteristics.133 Prominent commentators argue that 
this dynamic—in which homeowners can sustain or improve the 
neighborhood if they all stay and invest in their properties, but an 
owner who stays and invests when others leave will lose most of her 
home’s value—resembles the Prisoner’s Dilemma.134 As the ensuing 
discussion will illustrate, this proposition is inaccurate and leads to 
misguided policy suggestions. A more accurate characterization of 
the situation will suggest recognizing the community interest in pri-
vate ownership as the strategic dilemma’s solution.  
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a strategic game in which the prefer-
ences of the actors are ranked as follows: (1) I defect, other actor co-
operates, (2) I cooperate, other actor cooperates, (3) I defect, other 
actor defects, (4) I cooperate, other actor defects. Regardless of the 
other actor’s decision, a rational actor will choose to defect. This op-
tion leaves her better off no matter what the other actor chooses to do: 
at the most it allows her to free ride the efforts of the other actor (op-
tion (1)), and at the least it assures her that the other actor will not 
free ride her efforts (option (3)). The result is that all actors defect 
and the preference fulfilled is option (3), even though all actors would 
have been better off with another outcome (i.e. the resultant option (3) 
does not represent maximum social welfare).135 Thus in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma the best result is unattainable in the absence of intervention.  
 Yet the structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma does not correspond to 
neighborhood dynamics. Before laying out the perimeters of the more 
representative dynamics, the assumptions guiding them should be 
specified. Based on the discussion in Section II.B.1., I will assume 
that a resident has an absolute preference to stay in her stable 
neighborhood. I will relax this unrealistic assumption later. Deprived 
of the possibility to enjoy a stable community, she will prefer to leave 
and sell her house for the highest price. Monetary benefit, according 
to these assumptions, is a motivation, but it is only secondary to stabil-
                                                 
 132. Cf. DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK 
MANAGER 310-11 (2002) (discussing debates in the 1930s concerning the possibility that 
“feedback loops” could arise as a result of deposit insurance and unemployment insurance).  
 133. C. Leven, J. Little & H. Nourse, Neighborhood Change: Lessons in the Dynamics of 
Urban Decay, in HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 192, 196 (Roger 
Montgomery & Daniel R. Mandelker eds., 2d ed. 1979); see also OSCAR NEWMAN, 
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST 83 (1980). 
 134. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 119, at 13-15; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Economics of 
U.S. Low Income Housing Markets in Light of “Informality” Analysis, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 76 (2002). 
 135. See generally MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 
108-19 (Dover Publications rev. ed. 1997) (1970) (discussing the historical evolution of 
game theory and its potential applications, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma); RUSSELL 
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-30 (1982). 
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ity. I will further assume, at this preliminary stage, that stability can 
be preserved only if all actors cooperate and stay in the neighborhood.  
 Based on these assumptions, the proper ranking of the actors’ 
preferences is: (1) I cooperate, other actor cooperates, (2) I defect, 
other actor cooperates, (3) I defect, other actor defects, (4) I cooperate, 
other actor defects.136 I assumed that residents’ highest preference is 
having their environment remain stable, which means that both they 
and their neighbors remain. Unlike the situation in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, free riding is not available as an option here: in order to 
enjoy neighborhood stability, one must cooperate. 137  Defection, by 
definition, carries a price of losing the enjoyment the actor derives 
from the stable community. Hence, unlike in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
it is not the most preferred option, and that is why I swapped the 
rankings of preferences (1) and (2) of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.138 Once 
no possibility of enjoying the stable community survives, the actor 
would like, at least, to cut her financial losses (or make a gain) and 
leave the community. Yet when she decides to leave, other actors’ de-
cisions cease to influence her enjoyment of a stable community. They 
do probably influence the financial reward she reaps when defecting: 
if others sell as well, the price a buyer will pay her diminishes. 
Therefore, option (2) in most cases will be preferable to option (3).139 
The worst option, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, is staying in the 
neighborhood, investing in the property while the community disin-
tegrates. In this scenario, the actor loses both the benefits of stability 
and the financial benefits associated with a sale. Her investments in 
                                                 
 136. A similar ranking of preferences has been suggested for the decision whether to 
rehabilitate a house in a rundown neighborhood. See McKim N. Barnes, A Strategy for 
Residential Rehabilitation, REAL EST. REV., Fall 1976, at 40, 41.  
 137. The provision of stable communities differs from other local public goods, such as 
lighting and security, where free riding is possible. See Gillette, supra note 123, at 957.  
 138. This ordering is even clearer in a deteriorating neighborhood: an owner will prefer to 
have stability reintroduced over selling her home at a loss. In this case (unlike the gentrifying 
neighborhood) preferences for neighborhood stability and for financial benefits correspond.  
 139. I chose to restrict this statement to most cases and not all since there might be a 
difference between a declining and improving neighborhood. The logic of positions prefer-
ence (2) before preference (3) is obvious in a declining neighborhood: the demand for hous-
ing is limited to begin with and hence as supply grows, prices decrease. In gentrifying 
neighborhoods the situation is more complex. On the one hand, the above analysis of sup-
ply and demand may apply: the demand for housing may not be strong enough to offset the 
rise in supply. On the other hand, the demand for housing in such neighborhood may rise 
dramatically only after a certain point is attained. Most wealthy incomers arrive only after 
the neighborhood has been partially transformed by earlier movers. Therefore, owners of 
assets in a gentrifying neighborhood can receive higher consideration for their homes if 
they sell only after the turnover rate intensified (and major gentrification set in motion). 
Theoretically, being the last to sell might be the most lucrative option (preferences (4) and 
(2) change places). However, in many cases this is not a viable option, since rising living 
expenses in the improved neighborhood may exact a high price from a resident choosing to 
stay too long. Therefore in a gentrifying neighborhood there is no rule ordering options (2) 
and (3) (and to a lesser degree option(4)), since they depend on the elasticity of the supply 
and demand curves. 
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the neighborhood, which may solely amount to the loss of opportunity 
to sell earlier at a better price, are gone to waste. The actor cannot 
retrieve them, while standing alone they do nothing to provide de-
sired neighborhood stability.  
 Changing the ordering of preferences in this manner changes the 
dynamics of neighbors’ interaction. The problem arising out of this 
ranking of preferences is similar to the Assurance Problem, rather 
than to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.140 The major characteristic of the 
Assurance Problem is that if the actor expects the other to cooperate, 
she will cooperate as well, thereby assuring an efficient result.141 
Contrast this outcome to the one envisioned in the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma: there, even when the actor expects her counterpart to coop-
erate, she will defect (since she can free ride), and an efficient result 
is unachievable. Our case, on the other hand, is covered by reciproc-
ity theory: the collective action problem can be solved, but because of 
the assurance problem, we cannot predict that it will be solved.142 An 
actor confronted with an Assurance Problem, unlike one confronted 
with a Prisoner’s Dilemma, has no dominant strategy: her preferred 
action is influenced by her expectations of the other’s actions.143 
 This difference is of dramatic importance for policy-making. While 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma presents a problem of compulsory enforce-
ment, the Assurance Problem does not. In an Assurance Problem, 
assurances as to other actors’ behavior are sufficient to achieve an 
efficient result, and outside enforcement is unnecessary.144 Assurance 
is needed because in its absence an actor may not trust the others to 
cooperate. The actor will choose not to cooperate since her contribu-
tion will only have a miniscule effect on the desired outcome of a sta-
ble community, while it may result in the worst outcome for her: in-
vesting in the neighborhood without reward.145 However, once assur-
                                                 
 140. The Assurance Problem was identified in Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance 
and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112 (1967). The lack of clarity regarding the 
ordering of options (2) and (3) is not detrimental to the characterization as an Assurance 
Problem. Some variants of the Problem reverse the ordering of options (2) and (3). See, e.g., 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of 
Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392 n.40 (1998). 
 141. Sen, supra note 140, at 114. 
 142.  For a discussion on reciprocity theory and the assurance problem, see Robert Sug-
den, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 
772, 781 (1984). 
 143. The Assurance Problem is similar to the “Stag Hunt Game.” Hungry hunters have 
two options: work together and hunt a stag, which will provide them with a good meal, or 
individually chase rabbits, which will provide a poorer meal. If one hunter deserts the company 
and chases rabbits, the stag escapes. The best option, hence, is cooperating, while the worst 
is chasing the stag when all others deserted to chase rabbits (in which case the remaining 
cooperator starves). The choice is based on expectations regarding the fellow hunters’ be-
havior. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 121-24 (1977). 
 144. Sen, supra note 140, at 114-15. 
 145. This motivation to defect in an Assurance Problem has been labeled “hopeless-
ness.” Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 140, at 392-94.  
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ance is provided, enforcement is not needed in the Assurance Prob-
lem, for the result in which both actors cooperate is an “equilibrium 
point”—a point from which no actor would depart even after the 
other actor’s choices are revealed—since it is the actor’s top individ-
ual preference.146 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the result where all ac-
tors cooperate is not an equilibrium point: each actor will still have 
an incentive to defect and move to the result which is better from her 
standpoint. Therefore assurances as to the other’s behavior are insuf-
ficient in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.147    
 The assurance needed in an Assurance Problem, such as the one 
here, might be supplied by contracts: parties can promise each other 
that they will cooperate. This is the practice of residents in homeowners 
associations. Often enough, as seen in Section II.A.3., properties within 
such communities are subject to restraints on alienation. Rights ac-
corded to the association to block a unit’s transfer guarantee that no 
resident will be able to defect in a manner hurtful to the community.148 
However, outside such associations, in large and already constructed 
neighborhoods, the transaction costs of subjecting all developed prop-
erties to restraints on alienation impede contractual assurances.  
 In the absence of explicit contracts, an implicit contract might still 
serve as assurance. Implicit contracts can take the form of norms 
based on ideas of honor149 or loyalty to the community.150 The reputa-
tional injury associated with violating social norms may assure that 
the actor internalizes harms her defection causes to the community. 
Though such intangible factors probably are at play, they are not ro-
bust checks on defections from neighborhoods, as the empirical re-
cord shows.151 The costs of being denounced as a deserter are not 
likely to affect a community member contemplating a move, because 
she will not be around to suffer the harsh reaction. 
 Seeing that the market cannot produce an efficient contractual 
assurance that will allow an efficient outcome, the solution is regula-
tory intervention. Recall that in the Assurance Problem defecting is 
not a dominant strategy. There is no natural and unavoidable ten-
dency to defect. The actor’s choice between defection and cooperation 
is motivated by three factors: the costs associated with not defecting 
                                                 
 146. Once more, in a declining neighborhood the same result is achieved without such 
assumption. See infra note 159. 
 147. See Sen, supra note 140, at 122. 
 148. Restraints on alienation held by homeowners associations, unlike those held by 
parties in other contexts, are generally upheld by courts if they either require the associa-
tion to act reasonably or are in the form of preemptive rights. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 526 (3d ed. 2002). 
 149. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, supra note 143, at 36-37, 40-41. 
 150. For a discussion of the role of loyalty in economic and political markets, see 
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 76-105. 
 151. Fennell, supra note 110, at 51. 
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when others defect, the rewards offered by defecting, and the expec-
tations regarding others’ behavior. One regulatory tool for adjusting 
the payoffs—the first two factors affecting an actor’s decision—is a 
partial locking device. This locking device ought to make the resident 
contemplating leaving internalize the costs her departure will inflict 
on the community. It should make the option of leaving less finan-
cially attractive, and of staying less financially risky.  
 This alteration in the attractiveness of defecting vis-à-vis cooper-
ating also serves as an assurance. The resident, whose motivations 
have been changed, knows that her neighbors’ incentives to defect 
have also been decreased. Since she knows that moving has become 
costlier for her neighbors, she has more grounds to expect them to 
remain.152 Given this assurance that neighbors are likelier to stay, 
her inclination to defect decreases. The locking device sparks a rein-
forcing loop of incentives to stay, which renders the attainment of a 
stable community more probable.153 
 There is no need, though, for an absolute locking device making a 
departure impossible. Such a radical solution is only called for by a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the cooperative result is not an equilib-
rium point. Since this is an Assurance Problem, stability and change 
are allowed to coexist. Furthermore, because the game does not re-
quire such drastic measures, the recommendations it generates sur-
vive the relaxation of the assumptions laid at its foundation. 
 Two of the assumptions made earlier are unrealistic. The first was 
that there is an absolute preference for a stable community. This is a 
false assumption, as residents might prefer to leave a stable commu-
nity in certain circumstances and given certain financial rewards. 
Therefore, let me now assume a pool of residents, some still holding 
the ordering of preferences presented above in the Assurance Prob-
lem, while others, added to the pool, do not hold an overriding prefer-
ence for a stable community. For the latter, option (2)—I defect, other 
actor cooperates—and probably even option (3)—I defect, other actor 
defects—are preferable to option (1)—I cooperate, other actor cooper-
ates.154 The entry of residents with this preferences ordering to the 
                                                 
 152. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1965, 2007 (2000) (noting that purchasing home equity insurance can signal to other 
homeowners an intention to stay in a neighborhood experiencing white flight). 
 153. Another possible positive effect barriers to exit can have is that of stimulating 
“voice”: neighbors who remain in a deteriorating community will work to improve the 
neighborhood. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 122, at 79-80. However, the concern has been raised 
that people locked in a particular pool against their will may show a tendency not to cooperate, 
particularly where they view escape as imminent. Fennell, supra note 110, at 72-73. Such 
reservations might not be pertinent to the neighborhood stability context (unlike education), 
since non-cooperation will injure the resident’s possible financial reward for leaving. 
 154. The different way in which the two groups of residents rank their preferences 
relates to the two distinct values that an owner derives from her house. Logan and Molotch 
use the terms “use value” and “exchange value” to describe these two different benefits. 
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pool does not render a stable community unattainable for those other 
residents who cling to the original ordering. The reason is that a sec-
ond unrealistic assumption should be relaxed. I assumed that all 
neighbors must cooperate in the creation of a stable community. In 
reality, a neighborhood may endure a certain degree of turnover and 
remain stable; indeed, as mentioned earlier,155 turnover may in some 
instances be needed to maintain stability. 
 The partial locking device suggested by the analysis based on the 
unrealistic assumptions can now be examined in a more realistic 
world based on this new set of assumptions where a “mixed game” 
exists. With a partial locking device, those newly introduced resi-
dents who prefer option (2) to option (1) are still able to move, but the 
exercise of this option will become more expensive for them. The result 
will, however, remain efficient, as long as the locking device reflects 
their actions’ externalities—the harm their departure causes to those 
who seek to preserve the community.156 If this harm, now internal-
ized by the mover, is greater than the increase in welfare the mover 
gains by moving, she will not move (her ordering of preferences will 
change and she will join the group preferring option (1) to option (2)), 
which is the efficient result. The externalities of a move will decrease 
as the number of residents interested in stability decreases. Therefore 
as their number dwindles, the impediment placed on others’ ability to 
act on their preference to move lessens. This result is efficient, as it 
reflects individuals’ actual preferences: they now prefer moving to 
remaining. Even at this point a Prisoner’s Dilemma does not emerge: 
if all prefer moving, they may all move without injuring others.157 
 I can now summarize the conclusions of the neighborhood stability 
dilemma. In order to allow residents interested in preserving their 
                                                                                                                  
“Exchange value” relates to financial return, and “use value” relates to the essential needs 
of life, for example securing a “home.” Their analysis centers upon the interaction between 
residents, who prefer use value, and entrepreneurs, who prefer exchange value. LOGAN & 
MOLOTCH, supra note 58, at 1-2. My analysis centers upon the interaction between differ-
ent residents, assuming that different individuals, and indeed each individual, might hold 
the two conflicting preferences. Residents hold their houses both as a consumer good and 
an investment. The relative importance of these two values is not constant: residents differ 
in their attitudes, and over time a resident’s own attitude is susceptible to change. 
 155.   See supra text accompanying note 127. 
 156. Restraints on alienation within a homeowners association, discussed above, follow 
this model. If the action of leaving is more valuable to the seller than her staying is valu-
able to the community, she will be able to buy from the association its refusal right. If she 
cannot offer enough money to persuade it to approve the sale, her staying is more valuable 
to the community than her departure is for her, and a decision to sell is indeed inefficient. 
Courts should apply this analysis in deciding whether in an association’s exercise of a re-
fusal right is reasonable. 
 157. When an owner wants to leave the influence the decision of others to leave will 
have upon her wellbeing is not as dramatic as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It might influ-
ence to some degree the economic reward she gets, but it will not make her prefer the coop-
erative result over the result in which all defect. Her first priority is to leave, and thus 
possibilities of cooperation are ranked as lower preferences. 
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community to do so, the payoffs of leaving the community must be 
altered. This alteration is achieved by introducing a partial locking 
device, which makes residents contemplating leaving internalize the 
costs of their move to the residents left behind who prefer the preserva-
tion of neighborhood stability. The partial locking device will entail 
subjecting ownership rights to some kind of a community interest in 
the property that makes its transfer less attractive. This community 
interest is a peculiar right. It is amorphous and fluctuating. Its size 
and effect change as the influence of the property owner’s actions on 
her neighbors’ preferences for a stable community changes. Neverthe-
less, it achieves its important goal: it allows owners, otherwise hopelessly 
locked in a group dilemma, to enjoy the balance between neighbor-
hood stability and mobility that best suits their personal preferences. 
 3.   Conclusion 
 Even without ascribing any intrinsic value to the community, law 
ought to provide it with protection. Individuals prefer a stable com-
munity as a good that allows them to better enjoy their lives. Market 
failures prevent them from satisfying this preference, creating a loss 
of efficiency. Actions of actors in the real estate market generate ex-
ternalities that are not internalized. As property rights have histori-
cally been created, according to utilitarians, in response to needs for 
internalization of externalities,158 a community property right ought 
to be established. This right will diminish social losses created by ab-
solute private property rights and allow the internalization of the 
harmful effects of an owner’s decision to sell her property. 
C.   Right-Based Arguments 
 In the previous Sections justifications for the community interest 
in property were sought in theories that view and evaluate reality 
through a social prism: the community for the communitarian, ag-
gregate social welfare for the utilitarian. In this Section I will dem-
onstrate that even theories that focus solely on the individual and her 
rights, rights that should not be overridden for community goals or col-
lective welfare, support recognizing the community aspect of property.  
 As Jeremy Waldron defines it, a “right-based argument for private 
property is . . . an argument which takes an individual interest to be 
sufficiently important in itself to justify holding others (especially the 
government) to be under duties to create, secure, maintain, or respect 
an institution of private property.”159 This Section will review two 
such individual interests that lie at the heart of influential right-
                                                 
 158. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
348-50 (1967). 
 159. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115 (1988). 
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based arguments for private property: personhood and labor-desert. 
The Section will demonstrate that neither is sufficiently important to 
justify holding others under a duty to maintain absolute individualis-
tic property rights. Both will be shown to justify a duty to respect a 
community interest in private property rights.  
 1.   Personhood Theory 
 No right-based argument for property focuses more on the indi-
vidual and her powers as an independent owner than personhood 
theory. This theory ties the institution of private property to the 
owner’s basic attributes of personality; it relates property to a per-
son’s humanity. Still, as the ensuing discussion will show, despite its 
avowed individualism, personhood theory’s conception of private 
property is incoherent, on its own terms, without recognizing the 
community aspect of ownership. In order to serve the important role 
that personhood theory assigns to it, ownership must include a com-
munity component that will assure the stability of the neighborhood 
where the property is situated.  
 Personhood theory is a tradition originating in the ideas of Aris-
totle and Hegel.160 Its most prominent modern advocate is Margaret 
Radin. Radin claims that certain properties, “personal properties,” 
are bound up with personhood,161 and that these properties must be 
guaranteed to every person. 162  Such “personal properties” deserve 
more extensive protection than other kinds of property—“fungible” 
properties—held for purely instrumental reasons.163 The determination 
as to which properties constitute “personal properties” is based on 
shared understandings.164 Radin and others present the home as the 
most striking example of a “personal property.”165 A shared understand-
ing has evolved in American society that housing is not a mere commod-
ity, but a crucial element in allowing people to flourish personally.166  
 Therefore, personhood theory, as Radin explains, holds that a per-
son should be allowed to have the choice between leaving and re-
maining in the home and environment—“context”—to which she has 
become attached.167 For this reason, property law must extend special 
                                                 
 160. Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII: 
PROPERTY 187, 209-10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). For a survey 
and critique of Hegel’s discussion of property see WALDRON, supra note 159, at 351-89. 
 161.  RADIN, supra note 68, at 37. 
 162.  Id. at 36-38, 43. 
 163. Id. at 53, 55-56. 
 164. Id. at 11, 18. 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 56-57, 84; WALDRON, supra note 159, at 296; Joseph William Singer, 
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 682-84 (1988).   
 166. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 361 (1997). 
 167. RADIN, supra note 68, at 23-24, 30. 
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protection to an owner’s right to keep her home. This protection is 
apparent in different bodies of law, such as adverse possession, emi-
nent domain, privacy, takings jurisprudence, and tenant rights.  
 This legal approach of personhood theory, however, ignores an 
important variable: it might assure a person’s option of remaining in 
the “context,” yet it does not assure her that the “context”—the com-
munity—will remain. Personhood theory envisions the home as a rich 
and meaningful social institution, embodying the person’s relation-
ship to herself and her surroundings. But when translating this phi-
losophical notion into property law rules, the theory conceives the 
home as merely a parcel of land and four walls to be protected. If it 
were to follow its own ideas regarding the home’s role, the theory 
would adopt a broader legal attitude to preserving the home. Describ-
ing the ideas animating personhood theory, Radin explains:  
Contextuality means that physical and social contexts are integral 
to personal individuation, to self-development. . . . The relationship 
between personhood and context requires a positive commitment to 
act so as to create and maintain particular contexts of environment and 
community. Recognition of the need for such a commitment turns 
toward a positive view of freedom . . . in which proper self-development, 
as a requirement of personhood, could in principle sometimes take 
precedence over one’s momentary desires or preferences.168  
This exploration into the notion of “contextuality” implies a need for 
subjecting at times the individual’s impulses to restraints assuring 
the context’s survival. Yet the common celebration of the home-
owner’s “personal right” by personhood theory ignores this duty 
which is essential to being part of a context.   
 If property law is to respect constitutive attachments, as person-
hood theory demands, it should strengthen the resident’s right to her 
home—the traditional banner of personhood theory—but also provide 
disincentives against dissolving the community. This does not mean 
that one resident’s option to leave should be blocked so as to allow 
another resident to preserve her “context” forever undisturbed. The 
first resident too enjoys personhood rights allowing her the same 
choice between remaining in her “context” and leaving. Even when 
property is conceived as freedom to create the social arrangements a 
person desires, the person’s choice does not have conclusive effect, 
since other persons—other decisionmakers—are involved.169 However, 
rendering the choice to leave the “context” harder is legitimate in 
personhood theory’s terms.  
 A resident choosing to leave her house and neighborhood perceives 
the house and neighborhood as “fungible goods,” goods that she can 
                                                 
 168. Radin, supra note 61, at 1905. 
 169. See WALDRON, supra note 159, at 296-97. 
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replace. By moving she is actively seeking to replace them, and thus 
now these goods only represent in her eyes an instrumental mone-
tary value. In contrast, for the neighbor remaining behind, the con-
text still represents a “personal good.” In the conflict between the two, 
the interest of the person for whom the good is a “personal good” 
should prevail, according to personhood theory. 170  Therefore the 
community’s interest in property, a tool that will make leaving a 
neighborhood more difficult as means for preserving the “context,” 
can and should become a part of personhood theory. 
 Without it, and as long as personhood focuses solely on the indi-
vidual right to a specific asset, personhood theory cannot serve its 
own goals of creating property rules that preserve the owner’s per-
sonality and deepest attachments. As William Simon notes when cri-
tiquing the theory, “[i]t may be harder to assimilate into a new com-
munity than to recreate a comfortable home environment, and loss of 
membership in a community seems a more serious threat to identity 
than loss of a particular dwelling.”171 
  Simon believes that the community can only be afforded the nec-
essary legal protection under communitarian theories, reviewed in 
Section II.A. This conclusion may be too hasty. The emphasis on a 
person’s attachment to her community can come not only from a firm 
belief in the community, but also from an unwavering dedication to 
the person and her needs as a human being. The obligation to pre-
serve the community can be explained within personhood theory’s 
framework. This result is conditioned upon the framework being wid-
ened, so as to make it, in practice and not only theory, inclusive and 
responsive to a person’s attachment to her home and environment. 
Only in this manner can personhood theory and its emphasis on per-
sonal ties to “context” remain coherent.  
 2.   Labor-Desert Theory 
 a.   The Theory 
 Personhood theory presents a forceful right-based argument for 
private property. Still the most influential right-based argument for 
property is found elsewhere—in labor theory. The idea that labor 
creates a property right is deeply rooted in legal thought: “It would 
seem to be a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an 
axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled 
to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing 
public policy considerations.”172 This idea traces back to the philoso-
                                                 
 170.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 171. Simon, supra note 98, at 1361. 
 172. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 
216 (1954).  
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phy of John Locke. Locke’s theory of property holds that by mixing 
her labor with an unowned—or rather, owned by the commons—part 
of the earth or its fruits, a person makes that part her own.173 The 
entitlement to the products of one’s labor is frequently explained by a 
notion of desert. Though it is unclear whether this was Locke’s own 
intention,174 the labor theory is often read as a desert theory: a person 
deserves the product of her work.  
 If labor is the basis of entitlement to property, it must be defined. 
Locke himself did not devote much attention to this matter. Com-
mentators have suggested several alternative notions of labor. One is 
the production of something (even if valueless to society) that other-
wise would not have existed.175 A second possibility is that only labor 
producing something of value to others deserves reward—a “value 
added” labor theory.176 Finally, labor might be an activity that in-
volves pain to the laborer.177  
 b.   The Production of Value 
 This Article is concerned with rights in a residential unit. More 
specifically, it contends that the surrounding community should be 
assigned an interest in a house, that it should be entitled to some of 
its value. For labor-desert theory, the central task, when assigning 
property rights, is to identify the asset’s creator. Thus this Article’s 
question, “Who should have a right to the house and its value?” 
translates to the question, “Who labored and produced it?” This, in 
turn, given the possible definitions of labor, implies an inquiry as to 
the identity of those creating the house, adding value to it, or exert-
ing pains in doing so. Is the house’s value “natural?” Is it produced 
solely by the dweller? Is it the result of the labor of others who de-
serve corresponding rights? To answer these questions it is necessary 
to address the general issue of the origin and nature of goods’ values.  
 Until at least the second half of the seventeenth century, scien-
tists believed that when placed in the open air, putrefying meat gen-
erates, out of itself, maggots of flies. Following such experiments as 
those conducted by Francesco Redi and later Louis Pasteur, this the-
ory of “spontaneous generation” was eventually abandoned.178 Simi-
larly, few will contend today that if a house is placed in a neighbor-
                                                 
 173. See 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27-28 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1988). Locke placed limits on the ability to appropriate, none of which are relevant here.  
 174. WALDRON, supra note 159, at 206.  
 175. Becker, supra note 160, at 193. 
 176. Id.; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
305 (1988).  
 177. Id. at 302-03; Lawrence C. Becker, The Labor Theory of Property Acquisition, 73 J. 
PHIL. 653, 655-56, 659 (1976).   
 178.  For more on the demise of the theory, see John Farley, The Spontaneous Genera-
tion Controversy (1700-1860): The Origins of Parasitic Worms, 5 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 95 (1972).  
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hood, it will generate, out of itself, its value. More generally, it is ac-
cepted that “our concern for goods . . . . does not arise in spontaneous 
consumer need,” as renowned economist John Galbraith put it.179 
Nevertheless, while “spontaneous generation” has long ceased to in-
fluence thinking about the natural sciences, the belief that assets’ 
values are created organically by some natural need still affects our 
thinking about the moral justification for an owner’s right to the 
value of her asset and any increases in it. The remainder of this Sub-
section will criticize this outdated idea. In its stead, it will promote 
the argument that if the justification for property is that she who la-
bors upon a thing deserves to own it, then when part of the thing’s 
value is created by society, society deserves an interest in it.  
 Philosophers and economists have been noting that the values of 
goods, and accordingly their prices, are not natural, but social. Locke 
himself distinguished money and other “treasures” from goods that 
are naturally needed. “[A]s to Money, and such Riches and Treasure,” 
he wrote,  
these are none of Natures Goods, they have but a Phantastical 
imaginary value: Nature has put no such upon them: They are of 
no more account by her standard, than the Wampompeke of the 
Americans to an European Prince, or the Silver Money of Europe 
would have been formerly to an American.180  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who lamented the replacement of the romantic 
state of nature by civilized society, described the latter as an “assem-
blage of artificial men and factitious passions, which . . . have no 
foundation in nature.”181 He viewed civilized man as constantly living 
“outside himself,” a man whose needs and desires—anything but 
natural—are created by society, and who has hence ceased to be free.182  
 Like Rousseau, John Stuart Mill was concerned about the modern 
separation of actual values and desires from natural needs and “true” 
values. Relying on a labor theory and conceiving labor as related to 
efforts, Mill criticized the economy of his times, where labor’s re-
wards were not proportional to the pains exerted.183 Karl Marx’s ap-
proach to workers’ entitlements in the nineteenth century was simi-
lar. Furthermore, he sought to make people realize that decisions re-
garding production and distribution are not natural, but are rather 
made by men. He believed that the characterization of such decisions 
                                                 
 179. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 132 (4th ed. 1984). 
 180. LOCKE, supra note 173, § 184. 
 181. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DISCOURSES 137 (Susan Dunn ed., 2002). 
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as natural consequences of properties of the produced commodities, 
accompanied by the claim that value is intrinsic to the commodity, 
were means of concealing the true nature of these decisions and val-
ues.184 In reality, they are events that individuals themselves bring 
about through concrete social activities. By hiding this reality, an 
illusion is created that the actual patterns of production and distri-
bution are the necessary ones.185  
 These insights have been largely incorporated into twentieth cen-
tury theories of markets and prices. As already seen, Galbraith at-
tacked the myth of consumer sovereignty. He emphasized that pref-
erences and demand were to some degree created by production—the 
same activity depicted as reacting to consumer needs.186 Similarly, 
Walzer argues that goods themselves are inter-subjective, and not 
objective, creations:  
All the goods with which distributive justice is concerned are social 
goods. . . . Goods in the world have shared meanings because con-
ception and creation are social processes. For the same reason, 
goods have different meanings in different societies. The same 
‘thing’ is valued for different reasons, or it is valued here and dis-
valued there.187  
 Ross Zucker elaborates on the impact of this realization upon con-
cepts of justice and equality. Social influences—generated by all 
community members—greatly affect the formation and character of 
individuals’ consumer wants, which determine economic value. 
Zucker explains that needs are formed in an interdependent, inter-
subjective manner because the individual constitutes herself so as to 
accommodate others’ needs; she must be able to provide others with 
means to satisfy their needs so she can receive in exchange means to 
satisfy her needs.188 She must also develop her needs in a manner 
that will enable them to be satisfied by things other persons pro-
vide.189 The capitalist system is thus sustained by common action of 
all the members of the economic community.190 Zucker concludes that 
every member of the economic community should be entitled to an 
equal share of some of the national income, as each contributed to 
its creation.191  
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 c.   The Production of Residential Properties’ Value 
 All these arguments highlight the social nature of the economic 
value of assets, which is evident in the case of residential properties. 
In his book The Production of Space, discussing urban space in gen-
eral, the influential French sociologist and philosopher, Henri Le-
febvre, wrote that “Space is permeated with social relations; it is not 
only supported by social relations but it is also producing and pro-
duced by social relations.”192 The value of a house is the product of 
many factors, only one of which is the structure’s quality and the 
owner’s patterns of investment in it. Other impactful factors are gen-
erated by the surrounding community. First, much of the change in a 
house’s value is the outcome of public investment in the city, of 
changes in the regional and national economy, and of changes in the 
way the real estate market is regulated and taxed.193 Second, an up-
grade to one property may improve the market value of nearby prop-
erties (neglect will have similar, though detrimental, effects). 194 
Hence, some of the value of my property is created by the investment 
of my neighbor in her property. Third, the house’s value is influenced 
by neighborhood context. In the dynamics associated with neighbor-
hood change, areal factors play a major role.195 The value of my prop-
erty is a function of the common perception of my neighborhood: if 
others view it as up-and-coming and desirable, the value will in-
crease. If they perceive it as declining, the value will decrease.196 The 
stigma or status conferred on a particular neighborhood distorts the 
allocation of resources.197 Rolf Goetze goes as far as stating that ac-
tual events such as changes in credit availability and facts regarding 
turnover rates often go unnoticed when deciding whether to live in a 
neighborhood and invest in a house, until reported by the media.198 
Neighborhood confidence, which determines property values, is pro-
duced by attitudes’ change, rather than by housing obsolescence.199  
 A house’s value is deeply influenced by social perceptions. Hence, 
labor-desert ideas can hardly justify the owner’s entitlement to the 
full increase in its value. The owner did not create it alone. The same 
goes for decreases in value. This conclusion holds, no matter which 
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meaning of labor is adopted. The owner did not create something new, 
the added value was not wholly due to her efforts, and the pains she 
suffered are limited to those associated with improvements she made, 
which form only part of the story. The community, on the other hand, 
labored on the asset and accordingly deserves reward. It created 
something new: a trendy neighborhood where previously there was a 
forgotten one. This something new is of value to society. Finally, ef-
forts were made by the community: the improvement in the percep-
tion of one neighborhood normally entails the deterioration of that of 
others—the harms caused to those other neighborhoods are “pains” 
the community endured. 200 
 d.   Conclusion 
 Part of the change in a residential unit’s value is due to changing 
attributes of the community where it is situated. These attributes are 
created not by the unit’s owner, but by public perceptions or economic 
circumstances, improvements to neighbors’ houses, and government 
investment in infrastructure. As John Morgan and Harvey Molotch 
conclude, in the market for places and homes “price is sociological.”201 
There is nothing “natural” about it.202 Therefore, in accordance with 
notions of desert, the community that labored on creating part of the 
asset’s value should maintain a property right in that part: the com-
munity aspect of property. 
 Still, a caveat must be added regarding this application of 
Lockean theory. The relationship of the preceding analysis to labor 
theory is complicated. The discussion is consonant with the theory’s 
spirit and logic, yet the theory as written by Locke might not accom-
modate it. Locke’s theory was a theory of first appropriation: the first 
man who labors on an unowned asset is entitled to own it. After this 
appropriation, a later laborer on the same—but now owned—asset 
will acquire nothing. Locke’s is a theory of natural rights, of histori-
cal entitlements.203 As such, it encounters difficulties in acknowledg-
ing any property interest in the house credited to the community (or 
anyone else) after an original owner acquired the asset. Theories of 
natural rights are static theories; they thus might be irrelevant to 
real-world problems of a developed interdependent society. I will ad-
dress this difficulty in the following two Subsections. 
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3.   Property as a Natural Right  
 The preceding discussion explored two right-based arguments jus-
tifying property rights and concluded that they call for recognizing a 
community interest in such rights. This might not have been the case 
had those right-based arguments been read as natural right theories 
of property. The strongest opposition to the community interest in 
private property stems from natural rights theories. I will now point 
at the concerns raised by these theories and highlight the problem-
atic nature of their understanding of the role and law of property.  
 A natural rights and historical entitlement system is not a specific 
right-based argument justifying property. The natural right to prop-
erty can emerge from whatever source—labor and personhood being 
two contenders. The key element in a natural rights/historical enti-
tlement philosophy is that afterwards—after the right’s original crea-
tion—it is forever protected. The particular rule that determines the 
just origin of the property right is only of secondary importance. 
 Therefore, Robert Nozick, the most prominent philosopher of the 
historical entitlement theory, refrains from formulating the “princi-
ples of justice in acquisition,” though they are an important compo-
nent in his system of justice.204 Nozick holds that in a just world, a 
person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principles of 
justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.205 The only way an-
other person can become entitled to that holding is by acquiring it 
from her in accordance with the “principle of justice in transfer” (also 
not detailed by Nozick).206 This is a historical theory of justice in dis-
tribution, rather than an end-result theory of justice. The determina-
tion whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about, 
and not upon how things are distributed at the present.207 For the 
existing system of property to be just, it must be the result of trans-
fers of assets from those who acquired them in accordance with the 
original principle of acquisition. If those transfers were made follow-
ing the governing rules of transfer then the result is just—regardless 
of its specific character.  
 Such a theory would arguably deny the introduction of the com-
munity’s interest in property. Nozick differentiates his principles of 
justice from “patterned” principles of distribution.208 The latter specify 
“that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, 
weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of 
natural dimensions.”209 According to his theory, if a distribution is 
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arrived at by the principles of historical entitlement, it is just, no 
matter how “unpatterned” and random.210 Hence arguments for distri-
bution according to “patterns” of moral merit, needs, or marginal 
product, are alien to the system.211 The claims made in the former two 
Subsections that the community is entitled to an interest in property 
because of notions of desert or due to individual needs for maintain-
ing constitutive attachments are irrelevant to a Nozickean system. 
 This denial is reinforced when the role of first acquisition is fur-
ther strengthened, as it is by other writers in the natural rights tra-
dition. The desire to acquire is sometimes presented as inherent to 
human nature: a biological instinct or an uncontrollable psychological 
impulse, serving both as means for survival and tool for self-
fulfillment. For this reason property is understood as a natural right, 
predating organized society.212 On a less abstract and deterministic 
note, first possession has been justified as the source of property due 
to its alleged enduring role in most societies.213  
 If first acquisition or possession is the controlling factor, it is hard 
to argue for an interest emerging for the community’s benefit in a 
house already acquired and possessed. It is not, however, an impossi-
ble argument to make. Individuals can maintain natural rights in 
assets they acquired, and still those rights may be subject to limita-
tions, even in a natural rights/libertarian world—if the individuals 
choose the limitations. The property right voluntarily restricted ex-
ante is a complicated issue for libertarian approaches.214 On the one 
hand, such theories object to limits placed on property rights. On the 
other hand, they celebrate individual choice. Nozick’s assignment of a 
key role to voluntary communities is thus highly intriguing.215 The 
proliferation of these communities represents utopia for Nozick. His 
utopia is a framework—a minimal state—within which many societies 
exist, each living its members’ idea of the utopian society. Every 
group of persons sharing the same idea of utopia may come together 
and realize its ideal. Internally, the different communities may im-
pose restrictions on their members to assure the realization of their 
utopia. Had they been imposed by the state, these restrictions would 
have been unjustifiable on libertarian grounds. Yet the different com-
munities may enforce these limitations on freedom. For example, a 
communist community may redistribute wealth between its members, 
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while the central government may not redistribute wealth between 
communities.216  
 It may follow that the different communities should be preserved 
so that they can continue to live diverse utopias, thereby allowing 
each person to choose her utopia. However, Nozick emphasizes that 
the system should be based on a person’s ability to leave one commu-
nity and move to another.217 Community stability is to be achieved by 
the payoffs the community awards each member, persuading her to 
stay.218 Nozick’s utopia consists of “a world which all rational inhabi-
tants may leave for any other world they can imagine . . . an associa-
tion,” and not of a “world in which some rational inhabitants are not 
permitted to emigrate to some of the associations they can imagine, 
an east-berlin [sic].”219  
 But at the same time, Nozick acknowledges that absolute rights to 
leave a community lead to an impasse:  
[P]roblems arise if an individual can plausibly be viewed as owing 
something to the other members of the community he wishes to 
leave: for example, he has been educated at their expense on the 
explicit agreement that he would use his acquired skills and 
knowledge in the home community. Or, he has acquired certain 
family obligations that he will abandon by shifting communities. 
Or, without such ties, he wishes to leave. What may he take out 
with him? . . . Clearly the principles will be complicated ones.220  
 If the idea of “owing something” to the community is broadly con-
ceived, loyalty and a duty to allow peers to continue living their uto-
pia may serve as justifications for making leaving a community more 
difficult. Recall the issues explored in Section II.B.2.ii.: the 
Nozickean utopia is analogous to Tiebout’s model of the market for 
local public goods. While Tiebout’s individuals shop for municipalities, 
Nozick’s shop for utopias. Accordingly, Nozick’s utopia encounters 
problems similar to those that Tiebout’s model faced, namely the 
damage inflicted to the community by every departure. This problem 
renders the visions impossible to realize. Like Tiebout’s model, 
Nozick’s utopia can be saved only following the introduction of rea-
sonable controls allowing communities’ survival without turning 
them into “east-berlins.” This idea might, to the superficial observer, 
contrast the notion of the minimal state, which is Nozick’s framework 
for utopia.221 But the minimal state always plays an active role in 
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protecting property rights,222 or—in Nozick’s terms—in rectifying de-
viations from the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer. So 
why must it refrain from acting to protect a certain form of property 
right and community desired by owners?  
 These ambiguities make it difficult to assess the response of liber-
tarian thinking to the reinforcement of voluntary associations’ pow-
ers. They are symptoms of libertarianism’s general deficiencies. The 
theory is attractive as it offers clear-cut notions of justice, freedom, 
and property; but, for the same reason, it is also unrealistic. It fails to 
recognize the complex nature of property rights. In a world with more 
than one owner, property rights conflict and regulation must be in-
troduced to determine which right shall prevail.223 This Article dem-
onstrates the problem: while one owner—for example Ms. Rodriguez 
of the Introduction—seeks to preserve her property right as it were, 
another demands to secure her ability to use or transfer her property 
right as she pleases. Yet if the latter is allowed to act, the former 
cannot maintain her property right in its current condition. Answers 
to such conflicts—between one owner’s security and another’s free-
dom—cannot be found by resorting to an endorsement of “natural 
property rights” and to a denial of “regulation,” because property 
rights are found on both sides of the dispute. Society, not nature, 
picks the winners in such contests. 
 4.   Property as a Social Phenomenon 
 The natural rights conception of property is juxtaposed with a 
very different idea regarding the origin of property, explained by 
Rousseau in this famous excerpt: 
The first man, who after enclosing a piece of ground, took it into 
his head to say, this is mine, and found people simple enough to 
believe him, was the real founder of civil society. How many 
crimes . . . how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man 
have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or filling 
up the ditches should have cried to his fellows: Beware of listening 
to this impostor; you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the 
earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody!224 
This conception of property rights as a social phenomenon that could 
not have antedated society shatters any pretences of sanctity on the 
part of property rights. First acquisition can no longer be portrayed 
as natural. In a style reminiscent of Rousseau, Carol Rose explains 
the common law’s acceptance of first acquisition as ownership’s origin 
by its being a manner for communicating a message, a “text” intelli-
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gible to others. It therefore is not enough for the person to say “it’s 
mine”; “some relevant world must understand the claim it makes and 
take that claim seriously.”225 First possession is “the articulation of a 
specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and un-
derstood by a commercial people.”226  
  Property rights can only exist within a society. They are not a 
natural right that cannot be modified after the individual enters so-
ciety. As society defines the right, it may set the right’s limits.227 This 
conception of property makes it easier to recognize the need to re-
ward the community’s labor on the creation of the house’s value, and 
to constrain property rights in residential units in a manner that will 
better protect owners’ personhood. 
 More importantly, this social conception of property allows an un-
derstanding of property that integrates the different theoretical ap-
proaches explored in this Part of the Article. Joseph Singer has pro-
posed replacing the ownership model with an entitlement model, 
which will direct attention to the way in which property law struc-
tures relations.228 He explains that property rules not only protect 
individual rights, but also form the overall social context in which 
individuals live.229 Accordingly, the property rules chosen are those 
that shape the contours of social relations in a manner which accords 
with our considered judgments about the appropriate forms of social 
life. The central normative goal of property law is to protect justified 
expectations. The decision as to what constitutes justified expecta-
tions relies both on utilitarian and right-based arguments.230 As seen 
in this Section, right-based arguments, both those appealing to labor-
desert and those appealing to personhood, lead to the conclusion that 
the expectation that a neighbor will not easily leave her fellows be-
hind, is justified. Utilitarian arguments, explored in the preceding 
Section, and communitarian ideas, reviewed still earlier, converge on 
the same result. 
 These insights counsel that emphasis be placed upon the relations 
that develop between neighbors. This is indeed the approach advo-
cated by Singer: 
The relational approach shifts our attention from asking “Who is 
the owner?” to the question “What relationships have been estab-
lished?” The shift is partly a shift from focusing on the relation be-
tween the owner and the resources owned to the relation between 
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the owner and non-owners who have benefited from the resources. 
But more important, the shift is from a perspective that focuses on 
the owner as an isolated individual whose presumptive control of 
the resource is absolute within her sphere of power to a perspec-
tive that understands individuals to be in a continuing relation to 
each other as part of a common enterprise.231 
 This property theory has been applied to gentrification and 
neighborhood change. One researcher found that neighborhood activ-
ists in Vancouver based their struggle against development that 
would have led to gentrification and displacement on an alleged 
community property right in a privately owned department store and 
a public park.232 Residents viewed themselves as owners of the prop-
erties, in defiance of the classical ownership model.233 They invoked 
the entitlement model arguing that these properties became part of 
the community.234  
 In this manner the relational theory was enlisted to regulate the 
relations between the community and external forces. It can guide 
the internal relations between neighborhood residents just as well. 
The relationship between residents should be viewed as constituting 
a common enterprise—a community—on which all residents are de-
pendent. The residents rely on the relationship’s continuity: they in-
vest in their houses and make them the center of their lives, based on 
an assumption that their relationship with their surroundings, which 
benefits all involved, will persist. The reliance on such relationships 
should be protected. 235  Owners should have property rights—
community property rights—in the private holdings of their neighbors. 
 Property rights are the creation of society, not nature or god. As 
such, society may model property rights according to its conceptions 
of individuals’ needs, of justice and desert, and of desired social rela-
tionships. Hence property rights should be recognized when people 
reasonably rely on existing relationships with others. Reliance on the 
character of one’s environment, on lasting interactions with sur-
rounding people, is something that socially created property rights 
seek to promote. 
 5.   Conclusion 
 Right-based arguments, in their vast majority, necessitate the 
protection of the community’s interest in private property. The com-
munity is entitled to such an interest as a reward for its labor on the 
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creation of a portion of a house’s value. This interest is also vital in 
order to enable the existence of the individual’s personhood and to 
safeguard her “personal properties,” which cannot be detached from 
the “context” where she lives. Even if these or other right-based ar-
guments are regarded as creating natural property rights, they may 
still be understood as requiring the protection of certain communi-
ties—certain forms of property—that people voluntarily choose. Re-
gardless, social conceptions of property rights may be deemed prefer-
able to natural rights worldviews. From the perspective of these rela-
tional readings of rights, the absence of protection for the commu-
nity’s interest in ownership is particularly troubling. 
D. Conclusion 
 This Part of the Article has explored diverse property theories and 
illustrated how they all could support—indeed, necessitate—the rec-
ognition of the community aspect of private ownership. It must be 
stressed, however, that the fact that communitarianism, welfare eco-
nomics, and rights-based arguments all converge on this conclusion 
does not imply that their rationalizations are identical or that the 
specific contributions they make are useful for the same purposes. 
Thus, for example, communitarianism provides us with a rich under-
standing of the meaning and import of the neighborhood, but it falls 
short in putting forward detailed principles for regulating the rela-
tionship between the neighborhood and the individual: for balancing 
neighborhood stability against individual freedom. Welfare economics 
presents the groundwork for such a balancing scheme, but the intan-
gible value of the neighborhood is, too often, not a natural element in 
its calculus. Rights-based arguments ground the community aspect of 
ownership in the very powerful tradition and rhetoric of property 
rights, but, as each right-based explanation isolates one salient at-
tribute of reality, such accounts’ notion of community is rather thin. 
Those not exclusively attached to one specific theory will draw in a 
pragmatic manner on all of them when considering the community 
aspect of ownership. Those adhering to one or another of the theories 
are bound to view the community aspect in divergent lights. That be-
ing said—they are still likely to view it favorably.  
III.   THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND PROPERTY 
LAW PRACTICE: A PROPOSAL 
 A clear conclusion emerged from Part II of the Article. The com-
munity’s interest in property should be recognized. But how can this 
goal be achieved? How—if at all—can the community aspect of prop-
erty don a practical garb? The impetus for challenging property law 
theory to recognize the community interest was provided by a real 
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world problem presented in the Introduction. It originated in a diffi-
culty faced by actual owners whose neighborhoods are destabilized. It 
is thus important that the community aspect of ownership not be 
constricted to the realm of theory. This Part of the Article will sug-
gest one possible way of giving it concrete substance. I will propose a 
scheme that will grant the community the partnership interest in 
assets’ value to which it is entitled, in a way that can alleviate the 
plight of owners whose community is threatened.  
 The proposal distinguishes two disparate situations: one where 
properties’ market values are increasing dramatically—the condi-
tions characteristic of an improving/gentrifying neighborhood—and 
another where property values are decreasing dramatically—the 
common occurrence in a declining neighborhood.  
A.   An Improving Neighborhood 
 In the improving neighborhood the traditional individualized no-
tion of property and the community-invested idea of property, intro-
duced by this Article, contrast most strikingly. Therefore Ms. Rodri-
guez’s story served as a good illustration of the problem property law 
faces. In a gentrifying neighborhood properties’ monetary values in-
crease, while the community aspect of those same properties is 
threatened. Local residents are displaced. The owners among them—
like Ms. Rodriguez—might be able to reap a profit when selling. Yet 
they lose their community, which was a constitutive element of their 
property right and the enjoyment they derived from it.   
 In light of the fact that, as already seen, this result is inefficient 
and unjust, what should be the policy response? I suggest imposing a 
tax calculated as a percentage of the profit made in selling property 
and collected at the time of sale, accompanied by rent control. The 
tax rates are to be set according to the intensity of gentrification, 
with higher taxes levied the more intense the process. The estab-
lishment of such a tax corresponds to the requirements of the theo-
retical approaches reviewed in Part II. The tax will deter sales since 
it will render them less lucrative, thereby carrying a stabilizing ef-
fect.236 In this manner it will convey upon residents better chances at 
preserving their attachment to their neighborhood, as suggested by 
communitarian and personhood theories. It will make emigrants in-
ternalize their departure’s costs, thereby solving the collective action 
problem identified by utilitarian theories. It will compensate those 
remaining behind for the upsetting of their reliance and expectations, 
as required by relational theories. The tax will also be a reward to 
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society for its work on the creation of the increase in the house’s 
value, a reward merited in accordance with labor-desert theory.  
 The tax will be levied at sale. At that time, the difference between 
the price for which the owner bought the house, and the price for 
which she is selling it, will be taxed. Subtractions should be intro-
duced for improvements she made to the property, as well as for gen-
eral increases in housing prices in the entire region and nation.  
 The best way to understand these characteristics of the proposed 
tax is by identifying the tax’s relationship to other taxes to which 
property owners are subject. The proposed tax, like existing property 
taxes, will be paid to a local authority. Another similarity between 
these two taxes lies in their normative structure. The tax contem-
plated is based to some degree on the “benefit tax” principle of taxa-
tion, as property taxes are held to be.237 The benefit principle of taxation 
dictates that a person be taxed in keeping with the amount of benefit 
she derives from services provided by the relevant governmental 
body. Property taxes represent a payment a homeowner makes for 
her enjoyment of local public services. More importantly, these services 
enhance property values. Hence, when paying property taxes, calculated 
based on her home’s value, the taxpayer is paying the local government 
consideration for its services. Similarly, the proposed tax will be paid 
in accordance with the contribution the community, via public and 
private investment, made to the value of the taxpayer’s asset.  
 But unlike property taxes, the proposed tax will only be paid when 
the investment is realized—upon the occurrence of a sale. In this fea-
ture, the tax is comparable to the capital gains tax, which forms a 
part of the income tax.238 The reason for emulating the capital gains 
tax in this regard is obvious; levying the suggested tax while the 
owner is still occupying the house will achieve a result opposite to the 
desired outcome. Subjecting homeowners in a gentrifying neighbor-
hood to higher taxes puts further pressure on them, making dis-
placement practically unavoidable.239 Conditioning the tax on a sale 
relates it to the principle of taxation according to ability to pay 
(which contrasts the benefit principle of taxation)—the guiding prin-
ciple in income taxation.240 A homeowner is being taxed according to 
her ability to pay since she only pays the tax when she is in actual 
                                                 
 237. See William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners and the Benefit View 
of the Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 33 (Wallace 
E. Oates ed., 2001).  
 238. For more on taxation upon realization, see Charles T. Terry, Normative Capital 
Cost Recovery for a Realization-based Income Tax, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 467 (2002).   
 239. Property taxes might be viewed as undermining property rights, since they might 
compel owners to sell their properties. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 496 (6th ed. 2003). 
 240. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMY 61-63 (1959).  
2011] THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 809 
 
possession of the funds representing the increase in her home’s value, 
i.e., after she sold it for a profit. Nevertheless, the tax does not truly 
embody the taxpayer’s ability to pay. Unlike income taxation, the 
proposed tax is paid without considering the taxpayer’s overall 
wealth. It only deals with income gained from one source—the sale of 
a house. Such an approach naturally deviates from the ability to pay 
principle, which sets taxes according to the taxpayer’s entire in-
come.241 It also contradicts a major aspiration of income taxation, 
which is to tax similarly different investments, so as not to distort 
capital market decisions (i.e., not to have investors choose an invest-
ment solely because it is taxed favorably).242 The proposed tax targets 
a specific investment—residential units—while leaving other invest-
ments untouched. Still, this is not a problem: the tax explicitly aims 
at “distorting” decisions in this one market.  
 Because of these major differences the tax is neither an addition 
to the capital gains tax, nor a part of its normative structure. Rather, 
it in some ways evokes Henry George’s late nineteenth century pro-
posed comprehensive taxation of land value as a single tax.243 Al-
though rejected in most jurisdictions, 244  that proposal still exerts 
much influence on the way scholars think about land taxation.245 The 
famed economist and politician envisioned one single tax whose 
amount is determined solely by the value of land, discounting struc-
tures built on it. He believed that such a tax would be both efficient 
and progressive in incidence. In addition, he saw it as just, since 
land’s value increases due to social and economic developments, as 
well as governmental investment, while owners do practically noth-
ing to bring about such value increases. Hence, George did not be-
lieve that landowners earn these increments in value and conceived 
owners as occupying a different position than individuals who con-
tribute labor and capital to production and earn their compensa-
tion.246 This Article’s community interest in property, as explained in 
Section II.C.2., shares this rationale, though it does not separate the 
value of buildings from the value of land. In addition, the tax sug-
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ed., 1998). 
 246. See generally Coughlan, supra note 244, at 263-68 (examining arguments in favor 
of land value taxation).  
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gested has no aspirations at replacing other forms of taxation, in 
stark contrast to George’s plan.  
 Now that the proposed tax has been situated among other taxa-
tion schemes, and its roles and characteristics clarified, it is neces-
sary, in order to evaluate its effects, to try and predict who will actu-
ally pay it. Foreseeing the economic incidence of a tax247 is practically 
impossible, as it depends, among other factors, on the elasticities of 
supply and demand.248 As far as the relationship between seller and 
buyer is concerned, this is not a major worry: whether the 
owner/seller pays the tax, or whether she passes the tax on to the 
buyer, the tax’s purposes are attained. In both scenarios, the sale is 
deterred, and either the owner moving out or the in-mover internal-
izes the move’s costs to the neighborhood.  
 The incidence of the tax does raise a concern with regards to the 
possibility that owners will pass it on not to potential buyers, but to 
tenants. When sales’ profits are taxed, owners have an incentive to 
lease their properties for higher rents rather than sell them.249 Theo-
retically, rent proceeds should be taxed as sale proceeds since the two 
are economically equivalent. However, the danger is that landlords 
will pass on, via higher rents, rent income tax to current tenants, 
leading to displacement and the community’s demise. A better ap-
proach, thus, is to avoid taxing rent income. Instead, the sales tax 
should be supplemented by a more traditional rent control policy. 
Rent control prevents landlords from increasing rents beyond a set 
amount representing fair return on their investment. It thereby pre-
vents higher-income in-movers from outbidding lower-income ten-
ants.250 The rent control suggested here correlates to the taxation of 
sales and is thus justified on the same grounds justifying the tax: it is 
an embodiment of the community’s interest in the asset. Rent control 
will check owners’ ability to realize value increases by leasing for 
higher rents, thereby evading the tax levied at sale. It will allow this 
Article’s proposal, which otherwise centers on homeowners, to convey 
benefits directly to tenants. Rent control is probably the only tool 
that can effectively help tenants stay in a gentrifying community.251 
                                                 
 247. The economic incidence of the tax relates to the identity of the party who is unable 
to pass along the burden of the tax. It need not correlate to the legal incidence. 
 248. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1996); Walter Hellerstein, Com-
plementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 
405, 438-42 (1986). 
 249. For a similar scenario with a land improvement tax, see POSNER, supra note 239, 
at 496. 
 250. Rent control has been controversial for years. For an overview of the debate, see 
SINGER, supra note 148, at 777-81. For the debate in the context of gentrification, compare 
Molly McUsic, Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Hous-
ing Market, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1835 (1988) with Minton, supra note 95.  
 251. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 426 (2003). 
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Aiding tenants is necessary for the realization of the community in-
terest in ownership, as their displacement threatens the community.  
B.   A Declining Neighborhood 
 This Article focused on the operation of the community interest in 
a gentrifying neighborhood. However, as has been made clear, the 
community aspect of property is operable in all situations, and com-
munity stability is at threat in declining neighborhoods as well. In 
fact, the declining neighborhood presents an easier case for justifying 
the community interest in property. Maintaining it in such neighbor-
hoods implies combating the drop in property values, and thus it corre-
lates to traditional individualized understandings of property protec-
tion. However, when it comes to practical implementation, the chal-
lenge of protecting the community’s interest in such neighborhoods 
might be more complex than in improving neighborhoods. The reason 
is that the theoretical justifications for the community interest explored 
in Part II of this Article may diverge in their recommendations here.  
 When understood as created by society, the decrease in property 
values calls for a transfer of funds from society to the owner/seller, 
perhaps in the form of a negative tax.252 As seen in Section II.B.2, so-
ciety is the entity responsible for locations losing appeal. If the com-
munity is a silent partner in land ownership, partaking in its bene-
fits (as suggested by the tax discussed above), it should also share in 
the losses. 
 However, the stabilizing effect of such a scheme is questionable at 
best. A promising precedent is the experience of Oak Park, Illinois. 
When, during the 1970s, the Chicago community bordering Oak Park 
became segregated following white flight and neighborhood decline, 
the Oak Park community fought back by enacting an equity assur-
ance plan.253 The plan—financed by a one percent general tax on all 
local properties—is open to any single-family homeowner that enrolls 
by paying a fee covering the cost of appraisal.254 An appraisal is then 
made of the home’s value. Five years after the owner enters the pro-
gram, the protection sets in, and if an owner is unable to sell her 
residence at the appraised value, she is reimbursed for eighty percent 
of the loss.255 The plan has been perceived as a success: no owner has 
                                                 
 252. The term negative tax describes government payments made to citizen through 
the tax system instead of the welfare system. See James Tobin, Joseph Pechman & Peter M. 
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical? 77 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1967). 
 253.  Maureen A. McNamara, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner’s Equity Assur-
ance: A Study of Oak Park, Illinois, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1466-67 (1984). 
 254.  Id. at 1468. 
 255. Id.  
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ever sought reimbursement and the community remains remarkably 
stable. As a result, other municipalities adopted similar programs.256  
 Still, in Oak Park the municipality promised to reimburse owners 
for eighty percent of their losses. It is doubtful whether less affluent 
locales could assume such a financial burden. Yet if they solely 
pledge partial compensation for owners’ losses, the chances of repli-
cating Oak Park’s success dramatically decrease. A partial monetary 
compensation might not hand the owner a strong enough incentive to 
refrain from selling; she might fear the cost of waiting will be greater.257  
 Therefore, another policy tool should be developed. One possible 
approach might be lowering property taxes using public funding 
(generated by the proposed tax collected in improving neighborhoods) 
to finance the ensuing tax deficit. It is imperative that local authorities 
advise residents that the same level of public services will be main-
tained (or even enhanced) despite the decrease in property taxes. At 
times of abandonment city government often reduces services, or at 
least does not keep up with the greater needs of the poor neighbor-
hood. 258  It thereby, if only inadvertently, intensifies the spiral of 
neighborhood decline. In contrast, assurances that public invest-
ments in the neighborhood will remain steady, accompanied by the 
decrease in living costs, serve as incentives to stay.259 They help pre-
serve the community. The plan plays a role in reinstating neighborhood 
confidence, which, as seen in Section II.B.2.iii., is vital to neighbor-
hood recovery. Indeed, property tax abatements have been known to 
encourage private investment in neighborhood rehabilitation.260  
 Furthermore, this plan, despite its eschewal of straightforward 
reimbursements for property value losses, is not inconsistent with 
the community interest’s goal of reflecting the partnership between 
owner and neighborhood. Though not a direct transfer of funds, this 
scheme provides compensation for losses created by society: studies 
show that fiscal factors, namely tax rates and per capita municipal 
                                                 
 256. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 95/1-20 (West 2010). On the plan elsewhere, 
see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 152, at 2005 n.136, 2006 n.140.  
 257.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 258.  HALLMAN, supra note 56, at 218. 
 259.  Theoretically, any price stabilization scheme could also lead to the opposite result: 
it may induce moves. When the market trends downward, owners may refuse to accept 
prices that are lower than those the properties could have commanded earlier, and there-
fore they tend to stay put. The reason is liquidity constraints and also loss aversion. Once 
the market is stabilized, owners are thus less hesitant to sell. Lee Anne Fennell, Home-
ownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1109-10 (2008). While this may be true to some 
extent in the general market, deteriorating neighborhoods normally, as seen, experience an 
exodus of residents. In such places, the pre-intervention baseline is excessive mobility, 
rather than the lack thereof.  
 260. Judith Bernstein-Baker, Cooperative Conversion: Is It Only for the Wealthy? Pro-
posals that Promote Affordable Cooperative Housing in Philadelphia, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 
419 & n.229 (1988). 
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expenditures, are capitalized into house values.261 Hence, under the 
plan suggested here, the community will monetarily compensate the 
homeowner whose house decreased in value: the more favorable fiscal 
environment will offset part of the decrease in the asset’s value.262 
IV.   THE COMMUNITY ASPECT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND OTHER  
LEGAL PROBLEMS 
 Part III of this Article translated Part II’s theoretical insights into 
practice by suggesting a plan implementing the community’s interest 
in residential properties. This Article’s theoretical insights have im-
plications for the design and defense of still other rules of law. This 
concluding part of the Article will briefly review several such implica-
tions. I will highlight rules in other fields of property law that are, or 
can be, justified by reference to concepts similar to the community 
interest. I will also use the Article’s thesis to suggest reforms in sev-
eral of these rules. The discussion of each example will be merely in-
troductory. My goal is to point at directions for further research, and 
I entertain no pretensions of engaging a full exploration of each and 
every example. 
 The discussion will be divided into three groupings of legal issues: 
properties other than residential housing, nuisance law, and intellec-
tual property law. 
A.   Properties Other than Residential Units 
 This Article focused on the need to subject residential ownership 
to a community interest. The thesis relates to earlier calls for the ac-
knowledgment of a similar interest in factories,263 and commercial and 
public assets important to a community.264 Several other assets with 
similar attributes, in which a community may claim an interest, exist.  
 
                                                 
 261. For a survey of these studies, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use 
Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 
521-22 (1991). 
 262.  The plan proposed in this Part of the Article, in both its facets, can be viewed as a 
form of home-equity insurance. It insulates, to some extent, the homeowner from decreases 
in the value of her home that are beyond her control. The premium she pays for this insur-
ance is the loss of the ability to realize some of the increases in the value of said home. For 
an example of a scheme reimagining property rights in a way that will allow for the 
easier provision of home equity insurance, see Fennell, supra note 259. The program as 
proposed in this Article is a form of public—rather than private—insurance. Such an ap-
proach to the provision of the relevant insurance product might be justified as moral haz-
ards are likely precluding its provision by private insurers. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, 
MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC 
RISKS 79, 82-83 (1993). 
 263. See Singer, supra note 165. 
 264. See BLOMLEY, supra note 232.  
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 1.   Places of Worship  
 Church closings have become a major issue over the past few 
years.265 Faced with declining attendance and mounting costs, arch-
dioceses close churches that no longer appear viable. But worshippers 
feel that their churches should not be treated as standard assets with 
which the owner—the Catholic Church—can do as it pleases. They 
perceive themselves as entitled to a holding in what is not just a real 
estate commodity, but also an institution central to their communi-
ties and lives. Though not cloaked in legal terms, this is a debate 
about ownership rights in churches.  
 Throughout the years, courts have dealt with ownership in church 
properties mainly when confronted with controversies between reli-
gious fractions, arising out of a schism. Difficulties in deciding these 
cases stem from the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses. Because of the latter, the Supreme Court has held 
that courts adjudicating such disputes must refrain from analyzing 
religious doctrines in an effort to determine which fraction is “loyal” 
to the church’s tenets.266 Rather, the Court has suggested two alter-
native approaches. Under the first, courts must defer to the church’s 
governmental structure. This structure may be hierarchal (as in the 
Roman Catholic Church) or congregational (as with Judaism and 
Baptist Christianity). If the church’s governance is hierarchical, own-
ership of church properties resides with the church’s highest author-
ity, whose decisions are binding even when arbitrary or fraudulent. If 
the church is organized on a congregational basis, each congregation 
owns its own property and governs it. Under the second approach 
legitimized by the Court for settling controversies over church prop-
erties, a court is to apply “neutral” secular legal principles. It is to 
employ standard property and contract doctrines to the relevant 
documents setting the assets’ status.267  
 When a church closing is at issue there is hardly doubt that both 
these approaches allow an archdiocese to proceed with its plans.268 
The Catholic Church is the prototypical hierarchical organization, 
and it is also the properties’ owner according to secular principles. 
Thus traditional legal analysis of church property controversies pays 
scant attention to the interests of community members. Commenta-
                                                 
 265. See, e.g., James Barron & Jennifer Lee, After Vigil to Protest Church Closing, Six 
Women Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at B2; Vigil Ends as Police Seal Boston 
Area Church, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A13. 
 266. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). For a review of the cases, see Kent 
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1846-55 (1998).   
 267. For an analysis of the approaches, see Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: 
Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 348-57 (1986).     
 268. See Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 271 (Mass. 2004). 
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tors share this bias. In prescribing standards for church property 
disputes, the only individuals whose intent and reliance is mentioned 
as meriting consideration are those who donated money to the pur-
chase and upkeep of the specific church.269  
 This legal attitude is too restrictive. Part II of this Article suggests 
that the community aspect of church properties ought to be acknowl-
edged. This goal can be attained if courts, in applying ”neutral” stan-
dards to church property disputes, identify and enforce implied 
agreements between members and the church. Over the lifespan of 
the parish an implied agreement comes into being, encompassing an 
understanding that the church will, at least to some extent, protect 
parishioners’ reasonable expectations. The agreement implies that 
closing a church will only be the solution of last resort, and that the 
community will be supplied with an alternative place of worship. 
Progress can also be made if courts categorize churches’ governmen-
tal structure as congregational more liberally. Since courts must 
avoid religious doctrine, there is little barring them from setting their 
own secular criteria for defining a local church as an empowered con-
gregation, even when the church’s doctrine requires otherwise.   
 2.   Sports Teams  
 For many, sports teams are an indispensable component of their 
community and an important part of their identity. 270 As noted else-
where, “[f]or better or ill, a cultural hallmark of our era is the truism 
that almost any community’s most visible and cherished asset is a 
local major league professional sports franchise.”271 Yet most sports 
teams are private properties that can easily relocate.272  
 This reality bluntly ignores teams’ roles in constituting communi-
ties, fans’ attachment to them, and fans’ contributions to a team’s 
reputation. Several legal solutions have been proposed for these prob-
lems. First, there is the community-owned team model. The National 
                                                 
 269. See Greenawalt, supra note 266, at 1865; see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Who 
Owns the Local Church? A Pressing Issue for Dioceses in Bankruptcy, 29 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 375, 389-95 (2005) (examining the impact of donations on a church’s ability to 
declare bankruptcy).  
 270. See MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE MEANING OF SPORTS: WHY AMERICANS WATCH 
BASEBALL, FOOTBALL, AND BASKETBALL AND WHAT THEY SEE WHEN THEY DO 33 (2004). 
 271. Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations 
from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, 
League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 57 (1997).   
 272. The ability to restrict the mobility of sports franchises is limited by law. NFL poli-
cies restricting franchise relocation violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. L.A. Mem’l Coli-
seum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). The situation of baseball teams is 
different since the Court exempted them from the Act. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 
Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof'l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see also Jeffrey Gordon, 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and Franchise Relocation: Can a Team Move? 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1201, 1213-21 (1999) (discussing baseball’s antitrust exemption). 
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Football League’s Green Bay Packers is incorporated as a non-profit 
organization, whose shares are owned by fans.273 Another possible 
solution is limiting teams’ ability to relocate and obliging relevant 
approving bodies to consider the implications for the community.274 A 
third proposal is to award a team’s home city trademark rights in the 
team’s name, logo, and colors.275 Finally, there have been failed at-
tempts at acquiring by eminent domain the property of a sports fran-
chise contemplating a move.276  
 All these proposals raise serious issues of law and policy. However, 
they all evidence a belief shared by many that private sports teams 
have a community aspect. 
 3.   Other Examples  
 The community interest in the preservation of its culture and ar-
chitectural history may serve as justification for historic preservation 
legislation. 277  Cultural heritage is created by the community and 
helps define it. Consequently it deserves protection.  
 Even in non-historic districts, buildings’ façades are important to 
neighborhood life and confidence. The maintenance of the neighbor-
hood’s appearance presents a collective action problem. Thus statu-
tory obligations placed on homeowners to renovate their buildings’ 
                                                 
 273. See Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-Based Ownership of a National 
Football League Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL 
Teams, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 589, 593-95 (1998).  
 274. See Gordon, supra note 272, at 1259-64. 
 275. See Alvin B. Lindsay, Comment, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The Trade-
mark Rights of Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 915, 936-61 (2000). 
In one recent case, parties arrived at this solution by agreement. Ending litigation initiated 
by the city of Seattle seeking to stop the relocation of the local professional basketball 
team—the SuperSonics—the team owners agreed in a settlement that though they will 
retain the rights to the SuperSonics’ name, colors, and logos, they will not use them after 
moving to Oklahoma City. If a new National Basketball Assocation team arrives in Seattle, 
the owners will turn over those rights to the new team’s owner at no cost. In addition, the 
team left behind all banners, trophies, and retired jerseys. Jeff Latzke, Seattle to Retain 
SuperSonics Banners and Trophies, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nba/2008127774_websoni20.html. A similar agree-
ment was reached in 1996 when the original Cleveland Browns left for Baltimore, where 
they became the Ravens. In an accord with the city, the National Football League allowed 
the city to keep that team’s name, colors and records, for use by a new promised team, 
which entered the league in 1999. Jon Morgan, Deal Clears NFL Path to Baltimore, THE 
BALT. SUN, Feb. 9, 1996. 
 276. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 741 F.2d 954 
(7th Cir. 1984); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Balt. Football Club, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 
(D. Md. 1985); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); City of Oakland v. 
Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986). 
 277. See generally Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the 
Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981). 
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exteriors might be justified (lower income owners should be provided 
financial support to enable them to abide by such obligations).278  
 Finally, for more than three decades now, banks have been subject 
to a statutory duty to meet their communities’ credit needs.279 Said 
legislation was introduced to combat redlining (the practice of de-
nying credit to certain, mostly poor and minority, communities) and 
to force banks to reinvest in communities from which they obtain de-
posits. It is based on a belief that banks are obliged to serve their 
communities: that they are not merely market actors, but entities 
that carry societal duties.280 Though the law’s efficacy is debatable,281 
it reflects a conception of financial institutions imbued with a com-
munity aspect. 
C.   Stigma-Based Nuisances 
 A nuisance is “a substantial and unreasonable interference with 
the use or enjoyment of land.”282 Courts have stated that a diminu-
tion in property value, standing alone, does not constitute an action-
able interference.283 Thus, if, for example, an owner discharges haz-
ardous waste contaminating a neighbor’s land, she may be sued for 
nuisance. But if the hazardous waste does not reach the neighbor’s 
land, yet public perceptions stigmatize the area educing a diminution 
in the land’s value, the situation becomes more complex. As the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts explains, the tort protects the owner’s in-
terest in “[f]reedom from discomfort and annoyance while using 
land[,] . . . freedom from physical interruption with his use[,] . . . [and] 
freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of the 
land itself.”284 Stigmas do not cause discomfort and annoyance, nor are 
                                                 
 278. Many cities require owners to maintain the exterior façades of their buildings in a 
safe condition. See generally BUILDING FACADE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND INSPECTION 3-
44 (Jeffrey L. Erdly & Thomas A. Schwartz eds., 2004). In Israel the city of Tel-Aviv went 
beyond mere safety concerns and adopted an ordinance forcing owners to renovate a build-
ing’s exterior every fifteen years. Ranit Nahum-Halevy, Tel Aviv Landlords Now Required 
to Renovate Buildings Every 15 Years, HAARETZ.COM (July 13, 2010), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/tev-aviv-landlords-now-required-to-renovate-buildings-
every-15-years-1.301585.  
 279. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006). 
 280. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 349-50 (2000). But see A. Brook Overby, The Community Rein-
vestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995) (arguing the Act is better ex-
plained by principles of individual equality). 
 281. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 294-97 (1993); Lawrence J. White, The 
Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 281-87 (1993). 
 282. SINGER, supra note 148, at 305. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09-45-255  (2010); see also 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-97 (Cal. 1996); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
 283. See John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 299 (2001). 
 284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. b (1979). 
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they physical interruptions. At the most, they may cause emotional dis-
tress, but the Restatement holds that the tort is not addressed at protect-
ing the owner’s “interest in freedom from emotional distress.”285 
 Courts are thus mostly hostile to nuisance claims arising from 
stigmas not accompanied by physical damage.286 For their part, com-
mentators are spilt on the topic. Some believe that damages should 
be awarded as owners suffer economic affliction because of stigmas.287 In 
contrast, others claim that stigmas are prone to transformation as pub-
lic perceptions shift, and therefore plaintiffs may not suffer any finan-
cial harm; seeing that by the time they sell their houses the stigma 
might subside, owners’ claims for such damages are speculative.288 
 The problems accompanying stigma-based nuisance claims relate 
to many of the topics discussed in Part II of this Article. The social 
origins of market values, the role of perceptions in setting housing 
market trends, and stigmas’ negative influences on communities are 
connected to the review of the community aspect of property. It is 
thus likely that the policy proposal put forward in Part III of the Ar-
ticle will partially solve the problem of stigma-induced property de-
valuation. When the fair market values of properties in a certain 
community drop, residents will receive property tax abatements. The 
decrease’s cause may be neighborhood change, but it may also be 
stigmas. Providing residents of neighborhoods affected by stigmas 
such compensation may replace nuisance awards.  
 This scheme acknowledges the damage suffered by residents and 
is sensitive to stigmas’ devastating effects on communities. In this 
last regard it follows the cue of courts that have become aware of the 
dire prospects facing affected communities. Some courts tend to be 
more receptive to nuisance claims based on contamination stigmas 
when plaintiffs succeed in tying property devaluation “to a general 
loss in community quality of life caused by a particular source of con-
tamination.”289 Another advantage of the plan promoted in this Arti-
cle is that it only awards residents compensation for as long as the 
stigma actually impacts the neighborhood: when its effect subsides, 
values will re-stabilize and taxes will cease to be subsidized. Thus the 
                                                 
 285. Id. In the past, courts accepted claims for nuisance based on emotional anguish, 
especially those concerning the operation of funeral homes and prostitution houses. Courts 
have mostly retreated from such holdings. See Michael D. Riseberg, Comment, Exhuming 
the Funeral Home Cases: Proposing A Private Nuisance Action Based on the Mental An-
guish Caused by Pollution, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 557, 574-78 (1994).  
 286. See SINGER, supra note 148, at 319. 
 287. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear Itself: A Social-Psychological Model of 
Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76 NEB. L. REV. 452, 496 (1997); Jennifer L. 
Young, Comment, Stigma Damages: Defining the Appropriate Balance Between Full Com-
pensation and Reasonable Certainty, 52 S.C. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (2001). 
 288. See E. Jean Johnson, Environmental Stigma Damages: Speculative Damages in 
Environmental Tort Cases, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185 (1997). 
 289. Geisinger, supra note 287, at 467. 
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program mollifies the main concern of compensation’s opponents—
the fear of damages awarded to residents suffering no harm.   
 It should be noted, however, that this solution will not deter the 
original producers who created the pollution generating the stigma.290 
They will not be burdened with the compensation costs associated 
with stigma damages—a task that will be undertook by government. 
Since the polluters will be liable for the physical damages they caused, 
regardless of any stigma damages, it is not clear that such extra-
deterrence is needed. The public, on the other hand, which did not 
produce the pollution but generated the stigma, will be “deterred.” 
Thus, the duty to subsidize taxes in declining neighborhoods creates 
incentives for authorities to better educate the public in an effort to 
combat misguided stigmas. 
D.   Intellectual Properties 
 1.   Copyright   
 “Why buy a Vermeer when a Metsu is available?” The eminent art 
historian Francis Haskell argued that this “question, which may 
sound odd today[,] . . . would have been natural enough in 1800.”291 
In the twenty-first century Johannes Vermeer is a superstar, while 
his countryman and contemporary Gabriel Metsu is only known to 
dedicated art lovers. Yet for the first centuries following their 
deaths, the situation was reversed: starting in the early eighteenth 
century Metsu became one of the most celebrated artists among col-
lectors and critics, while Vermeer slowly lapsed into near oblivion. 
Vermeer’s modern rise, and the ensuing reversal in the artists’ 
critical fortunes, is largely due to a few exhibitions and a heap of 
publications, including a best-selling novel. 292  The current com-
parative stature of the artists “says more about our taste than the 
artists’ paintings.”293 Since their creation in the seventeenth cen-
tury, the paintings have not changed. The transformation in their 
relative stature reflects the arbitrary nature of art-world popularity. 
                                                 
 290. On liability’s role in achieving optimal levels of deterrence, see STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178-204 (2004). 
 291.  FRANCIS HASKELL, REDISCOVERIES IN ART: SOME ASPECTS OF TASTE, FASHION AND 
COLLECTING IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 21-23 (1976). 
 292.  The only time when the two artists’ reputations seem to have been more or less on 
par was during their own lifetime. Illustrating the changes in later centuries Adriaan Wai-
boer writes: “Whereas Le Brun needed the epithet ‘in the manner of Metsu’ to raise Ver-
meer’s profile in 1792, present-day taste requires phrases such as ‘in the age of Vermeer’ in 
order to promote paintings by Metsu.” Adriaan E. Waiboer, ‘Why Buy a Vermeer when a 
Metsu is Available?’ The Relationship between Two Dutch Genre Painters, in GABRIEL 
METSU 29, 50 (Adriaan E. Waiboer ed., 2010). For more see id. 
 293.  Id. at 50. “It reflects our modern penchant for streamlined and stylized aesthetic, 
as evidenced by contemporary design and architecture.” Id. This preference contrasts that 
which dominated during the artists’ lifetime, when people preferred works with a “decorat-
ing richness” of objects. Id. 
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What changed was not the works, but rather the public perception 
of them.  
    Intellectual creations, such as Vermeer’s works, have an inher-
ently social character, and thus the discussion of the community as-
pect of property applies to them. The value of protected intellectual 
works is created to a large extent by the community, and not merely 
by the creator’s talent.294 At the same time, these works are a consti-
tutive element of the community and its culture.295 These observa-
tions help explain the limitations law places on copyright protection.  
 First, a major exception to copyright is the fair use doctrine, which 
exempts some otherwise infringing uses under a complex calculus 
involving multiple factors.296 Some courts were willing to give sub-
stantial weight to the public interest/benefit under the first fair use 
factor, “the purpose and character of the use.” Some courts appealed 
directly to “public interest” while others folded “public benefits” into 
other concepts such as “transformative use” or “parody.”297 Commen-
tators have further suggested that the greater the work’s relation-
ship to the community’s shared values, the greater the need for pub-
lic availability. In such cases, and despite rulings to the contrary,298 
the fair use defense, so it has been argued, should be stronger.299 
 Another restriction placed on copyright is the temporal limita-
tion.300 A justification for this limitation can be found in the commu-
nity aspect of the work. As Vermeer’s case demonstrates, the farther 
we move from the original creative act, the more likely it is that the 
work’s continuing success is due to factors unrelated to the original 
creative labor.301 As time goes by, it may well be that a work’s success 
“owes . . . more to the contributions of society . . . in imbuing [it] . . . 
with certain meanings.”302 Furthermore, as time passes, works begin 
the passage from pure products of creative expression to objects that 
are part of the community’s collective cultural history.303   
                                                 
 294. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1197, 1237-38 (1996). 
 295. See John H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 
339 (1989). 
 296. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 297.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); SunTrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); American Geophyiscal Union v. Tex-
aco, 60 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1994); Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 298.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 299. See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 
1586-87 (1989).  
 300. Today, in most cases, copyright protection lasts for 70 years after the death of the 
author. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
 301. For an economic approach to the issue, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).  
 302. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 446 (2002). 
 303. Id. at 441-42. 
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 Another field of copyright law where the community interest is 
relevant is the artist’s moral rights. Moral rights confer on the artist 
entitlements relating to the meaning, representation, and attribution 
of the work even after she has relinquished title to either the physi-
cal object or the copyright in the work.304 Though mainly justified in 
reliance on personhood theory and the bond between the artist and 
her creation,305 some moral rights, especially the right of integrity, 
play a social role in preserving art for the community’s benefit. 
Clearly, for instance, there is a public interest in preventing the 
owner of a Rembrandt painting from destroying it.306 By carving an 
exception to the property owner’s ability to modify or destroy the 
artwork she owns, the right of integrity assures the safeguard of cul-
tural properties.307 The social nature of the protection guaranteed by 
the right is demonstrated in several state moral rights statutes. Cali-
fornia’s law, for example, was named the Art Preservation Act, and 
declares a dual purpose—communal and personal.308 This recognition 
of the moral right’s community aspect has an operative meaning: 
the Act allows public interest organizations—and not only artists 
themselves—to commence actions for injunctive relief to preserve 
works’ integrity.309  
 The right of integrity is also, to some extent, protected by the fed-
eral Copyright Act.310 However, the protection of the community in-
                                                 
 304. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Septem-
ber 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235 (1972). The moral rights include the right of integrity, 
the right of attribution, the right of disclosure (i.e., the right to decide if and when the work 
should be presented to the public), and the right of withdrawal (i.e., the right to remove the 
work from public eye). Sometimes the rights are defined and distinguished differently. See 
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (rev. ed. 2010). 
 305. See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 41, 42-45 (1998). See generally Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A 
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 306. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 
IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment 
as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 421 (1986). 
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After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1989). A 
counterargument can be made: the public interest may call for the freedom to alter the 
work. This argument, however, is much more forceful when the right of integrity is applied 
to the intellectual work, as opposed to its physical embodiment. My focus, as can be seen in 
the text, is on the latter: on prohibiting mutilation of the physical object. While it is con-
ceivable that the public may benefit from a freedom to make changes to an object (e.g., in 
the case of public art or alterations to an architectural work), the benefits of integrity in 
this context are likely to, more often than not, outweigh these. 
 308. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (Deering 2011).  
 309. Id.  § 989.  
 310. 17 U.S.C. § 106A, allows the author of “a work of visual art” to prevent modifica-
tion of her work only if it is intentional and would be “prejudicial to . . . her honor or repu-
tation.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  It also allows her to prevent the destruction of the work, 
if it is “of recognized stature.” Id. For a discussion of the role of the notion of a public stake 
in protection of important works of art in the legislative history, see JOSEPH L. SAX, 
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terest afforded by the moral right of integrity is not absolute: as the 
moral right is personal, it is limited in time,311 and, furthermore, the 
community’s interests and those of the artist may diverge.312 A fa-
mous example is the order the author Franz Kafka gave his friend, 
Max Brod, to destroy his unpublished works after his death.313 
 A related element of copyright law that can be tied into the cur-
rent discussion is the droit de suite. This right “provides that an art-
ist shall share in the profits accruing to subsequent purchasers from 
the appreciation in value of the artist’s work.”314 The right is recog-
nized only in California.315 It can be constructed to further promote 
the community interest in the work. In fact, it can be made the 
equivalent of the taxation of profits from selling residential units, 
proposed in Part III of this Article. The discussion of the community 
aspect of property implies that much of the increase in the work’s 
value is due to society’s labor—not the effort of the artist who is cur-
rently accorded the benefit of droit de suite. Thus, perhaps droit de 
suite should be redesigned to make royalties payable to a public en-
tity promoting public access to art.316 When considering such a pro-
posal, its effects on art dealers’ and collectors’ incentives should be 
considered. Furthermore, it should also allow for compensation to 
collectors who sell works at a loss, as did the program put forward in 
Part III of the Article with regard to sellers of houses. 
 The role of collectors calls attention to one more manifestation of 
the community interest in copyrighted works. If the work is to some 
degree a creation of the community, and if it is a constituent part 
of the community, rights of public access to works—even when pri-
vately owned—should be assured. This suggestion has already been 
made elsewhere.317  
 
                                                                                                                  
PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHT IN CULTURAL TREASURES 
25-26 (1999).  
 311. According to § 106A(d) of the federal Copyright Act, it lasts for the duration of the 
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 313. Luckily, Brod disobeyed. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Juris-
prudence, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 103, 115 (2002).  
 314. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 551 
(6th ed. 2002). 
 315. The author of a work of fine art is entitled to 5% of the profits of any re-sale of her 
work, provided she “resides in California or the sale takes place in California.” CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 986(a) (Deering 2005). 
 316. In California, if the owner of the work cannot find the author when she sells the 
work, the royalty due is paid to the state Arts Council for use in acquiring fine art. Id. § 
986(a)(2)-(5). 
 317. See SAX, supra note 310, at 65-68. For a critique of Sax’s proposal, see Jason Y. 
Hall, Who “Owns” a Cultural Treasure?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1863, 1869-70 (2000) (book review).  
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 2.   The Right of Publicity  
 The right of publicity, recognized in more than half the states,318 is 
the right a person, mostly a celebrity, holds to control the commercial 
use of her persona—her name, appearance, and voice.319 Courts and 
scholars have debated the justifications for the right’s existence.320 
Michael Madow made an interesting argument against it: 
Fame is a “relational” phenomenon, something that is conferred by 
others. A person can, within the limits of his natural talents, make 
himself strong or swift or learned. But he cannot, in this same 
sense, make himself famous, any more than he can make himself 
loved. Furthermore, fame is often conferred or withheld, just as love is, 
for reasons and on grounds other than “merit.” . . . [T]he reason 
one person wins universal acclaim, and another does not, may 
have less to do with their intrinsic merits or accomplishments than 
with the needs, interests, and purposes of their audience. . . . [T]he 
canon [of great names]—literary, scientific, cultural, even athletic—
is in fact a “socially constructed reality,” not a “law of nature.”321 
This argument is similar to this Article’s claims regarding the com-
munity aspect of property. The discussion concerning the creation of 
value in Section II.C.2.ii. illustrated that all properties’ values are 
social constructions. Madow’s depiction of the origins of fame is per-
suasive. Yet, as seen, publicity is not wholly different from other as-
sets in this respect. The case against the labor-desert rationale for 
the right of publicity, when framed in such terms, can be reiterated, 
even if only to a lesser degree, against other property rights. 
 3.   Patents  
 Copyright law, as seen above, considers the public interest in the 
protected work in some instances, but it is still mostly attached to the 
primacy of the contribution made by the original owner. Patent law 
moved closer to a more cumulative, collaborative conception of crea-
                                                 
 318. See J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: 
The Right of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 
199 (2001). 
 319. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Ex-
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1335-38 (2002).  
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 321. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Public-
ity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 188 (1993) (citation omitted). 
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tion in granting some protection to improvement patents.322 An in-
ventor adding an improvement to an existing patent can patent her 
improvement (assuming it meets the threshold for patentability) 
even if it infringes upon the underlying patent.323 But the new patent 
does not privilege the infringement on the original patent. Since the 
material covered by that original patent is put to use by the new pat-
ent, the original owner may block the improver from using the new 
patent. At the same time the original owner is also blocked from us-
ing the improvement—which is now patented by the improver. The 
result is known as “blocking patents.” The only way for either of the 
parties to benefit from the improvement is by striking a bargain. This 
arrangement contrasts with that which by and large prevails in copy-
right law: there, the original owner is bestowed with exclusive rights 
over future alterations to the work.324 The approach adopted by pat-
ent law relates to several of the arguments made in this Article. The 
value of the asset—the improvement patent—is perceived as the 
product of the work of several individuals and not only the original 
patent owner. Rights in patents are accordingly assigned in a man-
ner that seeks to promote efficient bargaining between the different 
contributors and to incentivize behaviors that avoid the detrimental 
effects of individualistic decisionmaking on joint production. The 
community aspect of ownership, as seen in Part II.B, aims at a simi-
lar goal. 
 Another relevant analogy from the field of intellectual property 
law is presented by proposals for replacing law’s exclusive rights re-
gime with a reward system.325 A reward system decouples the ques-
tion of the creator’s compensation from the question of the scope of 
protection awarded to a work. It assures the creator remuneration 
deemed fair by society, without granting her the full ability to control 
the use of her work by other members of society. Even more than ex-
isting rules, it allows society to strike a balance between the interests 
of the individual owner and those of other members of society. It does 
so by dislodging, at least to some extent, the traditional property 
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rights-based market pricing mechanism. A reward system is, in this 
respect, very much like the argument made in this Article about the 
social aspect of rights heretofore read as primarily individual. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
“This is the beginning—from ‘I’ to ‘we.’” John Steinbeck, The Grapes 
of Wrath.326 
 We live in an era of constant change. Technological progress, glob-
alization, and an array of economic and social developments have 
contributed to the creation of a society where everything and every-
one must keep upgrading themselves or be left behind. Against this 
background, it is easy to believe that law, in order to remain loyal to 
its commitment to freedom, should concentrate its efforts on facilitat-
ing the ability to progress, change, and evolve.    
 This Article strived to show that, at least with regards to housing, 
this perception is mistaken. It proved that different theoretical 
frameworks converge on one conclusion: community stability must be 
preserved. Property rights should be subjected to a community inter-
est. In order to breathe life into this theoretical insight, the Article 
suggested instituting the community aspect of property, a device 
making the option of leaving a neighborhood less attractive, thereby 
helping keep communities intact.    
 However, “[n]one of this is any guarantee against the erosion of 
the underlying communities or the death of local loyalties. It is a 
matter of principle that communities must always be at risk.”327 The 
aim of the community interest is to allow us to reach the middle 
ground, not to bring about a move from one pole—absolute mobility—
to the other—absolute rigidity. The community interest is to be 
molded in keeping with one of property law’s main social functions: to 
establish “a compromise between the desire for change and the desire 
for stability.”328 The community interest in property will render the 
departure from a neighborhood less attractive—but not impossible. It 
will not turn property law upside down. It will only make it more re-
sponsive to the needs and desires of actual owners.  
 Property law should lend a hand to Ms. Rodriguez and the many 
others who aspire to preserve communities they have come to cherish 
and regard as part of not only their ownership interests, but also 
their lives. This is by no means a desire felt only in gentrifying or de-
clining neighborhoods, though it becomes more pressing in times of 
community crisis. We all want stability. Yet absolute stability is un-
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attainable; furthermore, it is paralyzing. A balance must be struck: 
between stability and mobility, between safeguarding the status quo 
and making room for transformation. This Article proposed injecting 
a greater degree of stability to property law and community life, since 
currently, while very much attentive to needs for change, law does not 
always devote enough attention to complementary needs for security. 
